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There has been a backlash against the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system in 
recent times. Amongst other complaints, critics have argued that the ISDS whittles down the 
regulatory powers of states in favour of private adjudicators. These criticisms are premised on 
the fact that unlike commercial arbitration, investment arbitration awards may have far 
reaching effects on states. In response to these concerns, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group III and other similar bodies have been 
tasked to carry out reforms to address some of these issues. In spite of ongoing reforms, 
criticisms have continued with some countries abandoning the investor-state arbitration 
mechanism altogether. 
 
In Nigeria, the state of crisis in the judiciary has necessitated the need for a viable 
alternative to litigation. The ISDS framework therefore remains the preferrable option for the 
resolution of investment disputes. There have been recent attempts to amend the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act 11 of 1988. Also, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
recently announced plans to reform the country’s investment law framework. It is in the light 
of these developments that this research has been undertaken to examine the flaws in Nigeria’s 
investment arbitration framework and reforms that may be introduced to address them. 
 
In making a case for the retention of the ISDS framework in Nigeria, this study critiques 
Nigeria’s investment arbitration framework and explores a number of recommendations 
towards addressing current challenges. It is argued that the proposed solutions will improve 
the effectiveness of Nigeria’s investment arbitration framework especially with respect to the 
legal framework for the consent of the Nigerian government to ICSID arbitration and in the 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
I. BACKGROUND 
This dissertation is set against the background of the recent backlash against the Investor State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system1 and the ongoing reforms to address it.2 In the light of these 
reforms and recent developments in Nigeria, especially efforts to amend the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 11 of 1988 (Arbitration Act)3 and reform the country’s legal framework for  
investment protection,4 this dissertation argues that the investor-state arbitration mechanism 
ought to be retained by Nigeria.  
The premise for the above position is that, in the light of the crisis in the Nigerian 
judiciary and the attendant erosion of confidence in the court system,5 the investment 
arbitration mechanism remains the preferred mechanism for the resolution of investment 
disputes in Nigeria.6 In making a case for the retention of the ISDS framework in Nigeria, a 
number of important reforms are proposed to address current inhibitions and provide a more 
efficient investor state arbitration framework.  
The recommendations in this dissertation are measures that should be adopted in the 
Nigerian context, in addition to the reforms being undertaken at the international level by 
bodies such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Working Group III on ISDS Reform, among others. 
 
1 CL Lim, Jean Ho & Martins Paparinskis International Investment Law and Arbitration: Commentary, Awards 
and Other Materials (2018) 479-95; Yves Derains & Josefa Sicard-Mirabel Introduction to Investor-State 
Arbitration (2018) 13-16. See page 5 below for a more detailed discussion. 
2 See the draft working papers of the UNCTIRAL Working Group III on Investor State Dispute Settlement Reform 
last available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state, last accessed on 23 September 2020. 
3 See the Amendment Bill to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 11 of 1988. 
4 See Kingsley Alu ‘Nigeria begins reforms of international investment agreements’ Leadership 9 August 2020 
available at https://leadership.ng/2020/08/09/nigeria-begins-reforms-of-international-investment-agreements/. 
accessed on 7 September 2020.  
5 Pages 9-12 below. 
6 According to a recent survey by the Queen Mary School of International Arbitration and White & Case on the 
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system, the respondents expressed a preference for arbitration in 
comparison to other methods of dispute settlement like negotiation, mediation and litigation in the host state. See 
Queen Mary School of International Arbitration and White & Case ‘2020 International Arbitration Survey: 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’ available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2020-isds/ 
last accessed on 1 October 2020. 
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This study therefore evaluates Nigeria’s investor-state arbitration framework in order 
to propose recommendations to address some of the criticisms against the ISDS framework and 
create a more effective legal framework in the Nigerian context. 
II. EVOLUTION OF INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
Prior to the development of the current system of investor state dispute settlement (ISDS), 
disputes relating to investment were resolved by gunboat diplomacy7 and later diplomatic 
espousal and diplomatic settlement.8 An aggrieved foreign investor looked to his home state to 
take up his cause and obtain relief on his behalf. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the case of Mavrommatis Palestine Cocession (Greece v UK) expressed the idea as follows: 
‘…it is an elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect its subjects, 
when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another state, from whom they 
have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels.’9 
Diplomatic espousal entailed the peaceful resolution of a dispute through diplomatic 
means. In essence, the government of a foreign investor had to seek redress for the wrong done 
by a host state. The underlying philosophy behind this method is best explained by the dictum 
of de Vattel, that whatsoever injures the national injures the state itself.10 This method of 
dispute resolution later developed into a system which saw states submitting disputes to 
international tribunals especially mixed international commissions, national commissions, and 
modern claims settlements on behalf of their nationals.11 These modes of dispute settlement, 
sometimes plagued with uncertainties regarding how they may be invoked and the applicable 
laws,12 eventually gave way to arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute settlement between 
investors and their host states.13 
Investor-state arbitration, which has become the principal mode of dispute resolution, 
entails a foreign investor instituting a claim for breach of a treaty standard or protection, 
investment law, or customary international law obligations of a host state. Investment treaties14 
 
7 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern et al Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration 6 ed 
(2015) para 8.01. 
8 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 2-9; Christopher Dugan, Don Wallace,Jr, Noah Rubins, et al,  Investor-State Arbitration 
(2008) 27-31; Derains & Sicard Mirabel op cit note 1 at 6-7. 
9 (1924) PCIJ Rep. Series A No. 2, 12. 
10 E de Vattel The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns (1916), vol III, 136. 
11 See Maximilian Koessler ‘Government espousal of private claims before international tribunals’ (1946) 13 
Chicago Law Review 180-1.  
12 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 10-24. 
13 Ibid at 87. 
14 See for example Articles 2-6 of the UK-Nigeria and Articles 3-7 of the South Africa-Nigeria BIT. 
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and legislation15 typically provide foreign investors with approximately six measures of 
protection. These are: (a) no expropriation except in the interest of the public and in accordance 
with due process of law with adequate compensation; (b) fair and equitable treatment of 
investors; (c) full protection and security in respect of foreign investment; (d) no arbitrary or 
discriminatory treatment or measures towards investors (e) national or ‘most favoured nation’ 
treatment in ensuring that a foreign investor is not subjected to treatment less favourably than 
citizens of the host state or nationals of other foreign countries; and (f) free transferability of 
funds relating to investment.16 
 The establishment of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) by the World Bank in 196617 marked a major milestone in the growth of the 
investor state arbitration. As a neutral ISDS institution, ICSID provides a mechanism with the 
following outstanding features: (a) a valid submission to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre 
is irrevocable;18 (b) the unavailability of a challenge mechanism in respect of ICSID awards 
apart from the ICSID annulment process, thereby ensuring that ICSID awards are not subject 
to the varying laws of seats of arbitration as is the case with commercial arbitration;19 and (c) 
binding awards and the obligation of ICSID states to recognise ICSID awards in the same 
manner as final judgments of their national courts.20  
The ICSID Centre has become the most popular forum for the resolution of investment 
disputes and currently handles the majority of known investment disputes.21 For its part, 
Nigeria ratified the Convention promptly,22 enacted the ICSID Enforcement of Awards Act 
1967, and designated the state-owned oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), as a constituent agency pursuant to Article 25 (1) and (3) of the 
Convention.  
 
15 See for example sections 24 and 25 of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act which provide for 
the guarantee of free transferability of funds relating to investment and the guarantee against expropriation without 
compensation, respectively. 
16 Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore & Matthew Weiniger International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles (2008) ch.7; Rudolph Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 
Ch VII; Derain & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at Ch. 6. 
17 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 26-27. 
18 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
19 Ibid Article 53. 
20 Ibid Article 54. 
21 See https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/publications/icsid-caseload-statistics last accessed on 13 November 
2020. 
22 Nigeria ratified the Convention on 23 August 1965, becoming the first African state to do so. 
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Investor-state arbitration — which for the purposes of this dissertation is broadly 
categorised into the ICSID and non-ICSID mechanisms — largely addresses the need of 
investors for a neutral dispute resolution mechanism being a vital investment protection 
guarantee as an alternative to the national court of the host state.23  
Furthermore, having regard to the widespread adoption of ICSID Convention,24 and the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New 
York Convention),25 the advantage of enforceability of arbitral awards in a wide range of 
jurisdictions makes arbitration a preferable option. In contrast, foreign court judgments are 
usually subject to more stringent conditions and unclear legal requirements in Nigeria.26 A 
neutral and impartial dispute resolution  framework which helps an investor avoid the pitfalls 
and flaws of the court system is a vital component of maintaining a healthy investment 
climate.27 
Some scholars have canvassed the view that, there is a direct link between investment 
protection laws and treaties, and the attraction of foreign direct investment(FDI).28 However, 
other scholars disagree and argue that BITs and investment protection laws may not 
significantly affect the attraction of FDI and that economic and political factors  are more 
vital.29 In view of this, there is no consensus among scholars about whether the existence of 
 
23 Carlos G Garcia ‘All the other dirty little secrets: Investment treaties, Latin America and the necessary evil of 
investor-state arbitration’ (2004) 16 Florida Journal of International Law 301 at 322-25,27. 
24 As at the time of writing, the ICSID Convention has 154 member states. 
25 As at the time of writing, New York Convention has 166 members. 
26 See Adewale Olawoyin ‘Enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria: Statutory dualism and disharmony of 
laws’ (2014) 10(1) Journal of Private International Law 129 
27 JL Staats & G Biglaiser ‘The effects of judicial strength and rule of law on portfolio investment in the developing 
world’ (2011) 92(3) Social Science Quarterly 609 at 611-15 
28 Peter Egger and Michael Pfaffermayr ‘The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment’ 
2004 32(4) Journal of Comparative Economics 788 at 800-1; Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess ‘ Do bilateral 
investment treaties increase foreign direct investments to developing countries?’ 2005 33(10) World Development 
1567 at 1582; Lindsay Oldenski ‘What do the data say about the relationship between investor-state dispute 
settlement provisions and FDI?’ Trade and Investment Policy Watch of the Peterson Institute of International 
Economics Trade and Investment Policy Watch 11 March 2015 available at https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-
investment-policy-watch/what-do-data-say-about-relationship-between-investor-state accessed on 24 September 
2020. See also Dorothy Ufot ‘The influence of the New York Convention on the development of international 
arbitration in Nigeria’ (2008) 25 J. Int'l Arb. 821. 
29 Jason Webb Yackee ‘Do bilateral investment treaties promote foreign direct investment? Some hints from 
alternative evidence’ (2011) 51(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 397 at 409-10,426-9,431; See also Mary 
Hallward Driemeier ‘Do bilateral investment treaties attract foreign direct investment? Only a bit and they could 




treaty protection or a viable ISDS framework alone directly affects the inflow of investment to 
a jurisdiction.30  
It is therefore preferable to view measures to reform the investment arbitration regime 
in a jurisdiction as efforts towards creating a healthy investment climate rather than one that 
will necessarily attract investments. Furthermore, in the Nigerian context, as shall be seen in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation, the government has made concerted efforts to enact laws that are 
favourable to foreign investors, essentially making a deliberate departure from a legal regime 
which imposed a policy of indigenisation on foreign-owned enterprises in the 1970s31 to one 
which seeks to actively promote foreign investments in most major areas of the economy.32  
III. RECENT BACKLASH AGAINST THE ISDS SYSTEM 
Recently, the current system of investor-state arbitration has been criticised for several 
reasons.33 A key criticism of the ISDS system is that these disputes often arise from the 
regulatory or decision-making process of the government and investment arbitration entails the 
resolution of disputes with the government and public authorities through a non-judicial dispute 
resolution mechanism.  
These concerns are premised on the view that actions which usually lead to investor-
state arbitration proceedings often stem from the exercise of sovereign powers and damages 
are usually paid out of taxpayers’ fund by the government or its agencies, where the investor 
succeeds in such proceedings. For this reason, the implications of an ISDS award are usually 
more far-reaching.34 Other concerns include the inconsistency in awards, the lack of a system 
 
30 Jan Peter Sasse An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties (2011) 69-72; See also Susan D Franck 
‘Foreign direct investment, investment treaty arbitration and the rule of law’ (2006) 19(2) Pacific McGeorge 
Global Business & Development Law Journal 337 at 348-52. 
31 See section 5(1) of the National Enterprise Promotion Decree 4 of 1972 which was informally known as the 
Indigenisation Decree. Section 4 of the Decree proscribed the participation of ‘aliens’ in certain sectors of the 
economy listed at Schedule 1 of the Decree. 
32 The Nigerian Investment Promotion Act 16 of 1995. 
33 Derains & Sicard Mirabel op cit note 1 at 13-16; Lim et al op cit note 1 at 479-494; Maria Laura Marceddu and 
Pietro Ortolani ‘What is wrong with Investment Arbitration? Evidence from a set of behavioural experiments’ 
(2020) 31(2) European Journal of International Law 405; George Kahale III ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration 
Broken?’ (2012) 7 TDM ; Thomas Dietz, Marius Dotzauer and Edward Cohen ‘The legitimacy crisis of investor-
state arbitration and the new EU investment court system’ (2019) 26(4) Review of International Political Economy 
749; Olivia Chung ‘The lopsided international investment law regime and its effect on the future of investor-state 
arbitration’ (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 953 at 962-69. 
34 George Kahale III ‘Rethinking ISDS’ (2018) 44 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 11 at 22. 
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of precedent in arbitration generally,35 and perceived reverse discrimination against domestic 
investors.36  
The extension of the principle of confidentiality, which is a feature of commercial 
arbitration to investment arbitration, has also been questioned.37 This is because unlike 
commercial arbitration which usually concerns business disputes between private business 
entities,38 investment arbitration entails the exercise of the state’s sovereign powers and 
potentially, the disbursement of taxpayers’ funds in satisfaction of a final award that may be 
handed down at the end of the process. 
In 2010, in a paper to the Council of the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions39 outlined the Commission’s vision on 
the creation of a European investment policy by incorporating investment protection disciplines 
essentially building on the foundation of the disciplines that had been earlier negotiated by the 
EU member states in various free-trade agreements (FTA) or in individual investment 
agreements. Consequently, the recent free-trade agreements concluded between the European 
Union and Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam include provisions for the settlement of 
disputes by a future investment court.40 It has been reported that the EU intends to adopt this 
model in its future negotiations with Australia, Chile, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, and Tunisia.41 
The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Slovak Republic 
v Achmea BV42 on the incompatibility of the intra-EU BITs with EU law may be an indication 
of where the EU is headed regarding BITs as the basis for investment arbitration within the 
 
35 Unlike the principle of stare decisis in litigation especially in legal systems based on the English common law.  
36 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 483-85 
37 Derains & Sicard Mirabel op cit note 1 at 26; Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 706-07. Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr & 
Niranjali Amerasinghe ‘Transparency and public participation in investor state arbitration’ (2009) ILSA Journal 
of International & Comparative Law 337 at 346. It has been argued that the award in the sum of US$6.6 billion 
granted in the Process and Industrial Developments Ltd (P&ID) v Nigeria case would not have been awarded if 
the proceedings had been transparent especially in view of the allegations against Nigeria’s legal team and the 
manner in which it handled the country’s representation. See Kate Beioley and Neil Munshi ‘The $6bn judgment 
pitting Nigeria against a London court’ Financial Times 12 July 2020 available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/91ddbd53-a754-4190-944e-d472921bb81e accessed on 12 July 2020. 
38 Confidentiality should be excluded in commercial arbitration proceedings which involve the state-owned 
corporations because of the principle of transparency in public affairs. 
39 The European Commission ‘Towards a comprehensive European International Investment Policy’ Brussels, 
7.7.2010 COM (2010) 343 final. 
40 Derains & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at 15. 
41 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ‘EU’s Malmstrom makes global investment court 
pitch to stakeholders’ available at https://ictsd.iisd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eus-malmstr%C3%B6m-
makes-global-investment-court-pitch-to-stakeholders accessed on 7 September 2020. 
42 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v Achmea BV, CJEU Case No. C-284/16, Judgment of 6 March 2018 
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EU. In the Slovak Republic v Achmea BV case, the CJEU held that the arbitration provisions in 
the BITs concluded between the EU member states are incompatible with EU law. The CJEU 
took the view that the BIT’s establish a mechanism for settling disputes between an investor 
and a member state by an arbitral tribunal which falls outside the judicial system of the EU and 
as such cannot ensure the full effectiveness of EU law if such a dispute were to require the 
interpretation or application of EU law.43  
Although the decision in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV deals with BITs within the EU, 
there are other indications of the attitude of policymakers towards BITs as the basis of 
investment arbitration. Arguably, the proposal for the creation of a multilateral investment 
court to replace international investment arbitration within the EU is an additional indicator 
that the investor-state arbitration mechanism may further decline in popularity in Europe.44 
The United States government has repeatedly sought to rewrite its model BIT, 
beginning in 2004 with the introduction of its 2004 Model BIT.45 The 2004 Model BIT reverses 
the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investors in the earlier Model BIT enacted 
in 1994. Whereas the 1994 BIT provided that the investment of the contracting parties is to be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and in no case less favourable treatment than that required 
under customary international law, the 2004 Model BIT departs from this.46 The 2004 Model 
BIT provides that each party shall accord to foreign investments no more than ‘treatment in 
accordance with customary international law including fair and equitable treatment and full of 
protection and security.’ As one author put it, what was the floor has now become the ceiling.47  
The United States, however, appears to address some of the criticisms of the ISDS 
system in its 2012 Model BIT, especially those relating to the concerns about the whittling 
down of state’s sovereign powers in favour of foreign investors.48 Article 12 of the Model BIT 
provides that the provisions of the BIT are subordinate to the environmental laws of the state. 
 
43 Ibid para 56-60. 
44 Lim et al op cit 1 at 504-507; Thomas Dietz, Marius Dotzauer and Edward Cohen ‘The legitimacy crisis of 
investor-state arbitration and the new EU investment court system’ (2019) 26(4) Review of International Political 
Economy 749. 
45 Judge SM Schwebel ‘A critical assessment of the US Model BIT’, Keynote Address, Twelfth ITF Public 
Conference, London, British Institute of International Law and Comparative Law 15 May 2009. 
46 The US government has sought to address the problem of interpretation which has arisen from the lack of 
consensus among scholars about the minimum standards of treatment in customary international law in the 2012 
Model BIT. 
47 Schwebel op cit note 45.  
48 It is not clear if the US Model BIT cited at Derains & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at 126 note 66 is an earlier 
version of the said BIT. This version provides that the taking of alien property without compensation in execution 
of tax laws, maintenance of public order, health, or morality etc shall not be considered wrongful. 
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However, the BIT does not expressly exclude the right of an affected investor to compensation 
where the enforcement of environmental laws violates investment guarantees. Article 13 of the 
BIT contains a similar provision regarding labour laws and states that the parties may not 
derogate from or waive labour laws to encourage investments. Significantly, Article 29 of the 
BIT addresses the issue of transparency and provides that both the documents relating to the 
arbitral process and hearing shall be made open to the public. 
In other jurisdictions such as Australia49 and New Zealand,50 efforts are being made to 
exclude compulsory ISDS. Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
have denounced the ICSID Convention,51 while South Africa terminated its BITs with 
countries in the EU following several disputes regarding a breach of treaty protection.52 
Some of the criticisms of the ISDS framework are being addressed at the international 
level by institutions such as UNCITRAL and also at national levels.53 UNCITRAL’s Working 
Group II began to examine transparency in ISDS around 2008.54 In 2013, the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration were adopted in respect of 
treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014. These rules apply to investor-state arbitration 
conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. UNCITRAL also allocated to Working Group III55 
the task of undertaking a careful analysis of the complaints to generate possible reforms.  
As part of measures to address the complaint about tribunals composed of private 
individuals adjudicating matters involving the regulatory powers or actions of sovereign states, 
ICSID and UNCITRAL’s Working Group III published a comprehensive draft Code of 
 
49 Leon Trakman ‘Choosing domestic courts over investor state arbitration: Australia’s repudiation of the status 
quo’ (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 979 at 981,983; Jurgen Kurtz ‘Australia’s rejection of investor-state arbitration: 
causation, omission and implication’ (2012) 27 ICSID Review 65 
50 See Derains & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at 15. 
51 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 479. Jurisdictions like Indonesia have also terminated their BITs. See Nicholas Lingard 
and Lexi Menish ‘Indonesia BIT Termination: not the end of the story’ available at 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1148998/indonesia%E2%80%99s-bit-terminations-not-the-end-of-
the-story accessed on 3 October 2020 
52 Department of Trade & Industry of South Africa ‘Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework: Government 
Position Paper’ June 2009; Jennifer Reed ‘South Africa revolutionizing foreign investment protection system’ 
(2014) 6 Year Book of Arbitration and Mediation 295 at 298-9; Nicholas Peacock and Hanna Ambrose ‘South 
Africa terminates its bilateral investment treaty with Spain: Second BIT terminated, as part of South Africa’s 
planned review of its investment treaties.’ Arbitration Notes 21 August 2013 available at 
https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/08/21/south-africa-terminates-its-bilateral-investment-treaty-with-spain-
second-bit-terminated-as-part-of-south-africas-planned-review-of-its-investment-treaties/ accessed on 25 
September 2020; Jackwell Ferris, Challenging the Status Quo – South Africa’s Termination of its Bilateral Trade 
Agreement DLA Piper International Arbitration Newsletter Dec 10 2014. 
53 US Model BIT 2012; Lim et al op cit note 1 at  495-500. 
54 See A/CN.9/712- Report of the Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its fifty-third 
session available at https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.160 last accessed on 26 September 2020 
55 See https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state accessed on 6 January 2020 
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Conduct for Adjudicators in ISDS in May 2020 to regulate the conduct of adjudicators and to 
address issues such as pre- and post-appointment obligations of adjudicators, repeat 
appointments, double-hatting etc.56  
Given the efforts highlighted above and ongoing reforms to address the complaints 
about the system, the ISDS framework is preferable particularly in view of the challenges 
associated with litigation in the Nigerian courts. Furthermore, unlike the EU which seeks to 
replace the ISDS system with a judicial system,57 the decline in confidence in the Nigerian 
court system58 makes arbitration a preferable option in the Nigerian context until the reforms 
necessary to restore the Nigerian judiciary to its past glory are undertaken. 
IV. STATE OF CRISIS IN THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY AND THE 
PREFERENCE FOR ARBITRATION IN NIGERIA 
Arguably, one of the strongest justifications for the retention of ISDS in the Nigerian context 
is the state of crisis in the Nigerian judiciary.59 First, the quality of the bench has diminished 
owing to a flawed judicial appointment process, with allegations of the appointment of 
inexperienced and unqualified judges in some instances.60 Moreover, the courts have been 
 
56 See Draft code of conduct for Adjudicators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement available at 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/codeofconduct last accessed on 26 September 2020. See also Laura Pereira and Zara 
Desai ‘A Binding Code of Conduct for Adjudicators: A Step Forward?’ available at 
http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/a-binding-code-of-conduct-for-adjudicators-in-investor-state-disputes-
a-step-forward/ last accessed on 4 September 2020. 
57 One of the grounds of Kahale’s criticism of the ISDS system is that, while the judicial systems of the countries 
kicking against the ISDS system are not perfect, they make more effort than arbitral tribunals in the interpretation 
of laws and agreements. See Kahale op cit note 34 at 20. 
58 See pages 9-12 of this dissertation. 
59 Okechukwu Oko ‘Seeking justice in transitional societies: An analysis of the problems and failures of the 
judiciary in Nigeria’ (2005) 31(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 9 at 24-35; Ademola Jonathan 
Bamgbose Towards a Suitable Domestic Arbitration Practice in Nigeria (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Warwick, 2016) 20-34. 
60 Bamgbose ibid at 38-9; Tobi Soniyi ‘Lawyers ask Buhari to reject NJC’s nominees as FCT judges’ Thisday 8 
May 2020 available at https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/05/08/lawyers-ask-buhari-to-reject-njcs-
nominees-as-fct-judges/; Halima Yahaya ‘Controversy as NJC recommends relatives of Supreme Court judges, 
others for appointments’ Premium Times 8 May 2020 available at 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/391898-controversy-as-njc-recommends-relatives-of-
supreme-court-judges-others-to-buhari-for-appointments.html last accessed on 26 September 2020. The Thisday 
and Premium Times news reports relate to the nomination of unqualified candidates to the High Court of the 
Federal Capital Territory. The lawsuit filed to prevent the appointment of these unqualified candidates was 
dismissed on 30 September 2020 by the Federal High Court on the ground that the non-government organization 
which filed the suit lacked the locus standi to institute the action. See 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/417638-court-dismisses-suit-challenging-buharis-
appointment-of-judges.htmlSee s/; Bolanle Olabimtan ‘Osinbajo: Appointment of Judges in Nigeria influenced 
by Elites’ The Cable 8 August 2020 available at https://www.thecable.ng/osinbajo-appointment-of-judges-in-
nigeria-is-influenced-by-the 
elite?fbclid=IwAR1Sl7PqrQ5kEqIX3iWSyuFx3UhBGOP3UFBy7p1UI44mHQZPUGLy2D06TpA last accessed 
on 8 August 2020.  
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known to hand down contradictory decisions even at the Supreme Court level.61 There have 
been displays of incompetence and ineptitude and recently the question of how arbitration-
friendly Nigeria is was posed following a Lagos High Court decision which was manifestly 
contrary to well-known arbitration principles.62 
 Secondly, allegations of corruption have also emerged and become rife.63 Corruption – 
together with the snail speed of the proceedings - have led to a loss of  confidence in the 
judiciary. The dysfunction in Nigeria’s judicial system was highlighted succinctly by Abdulai 
as follows: 
‘That the nation’s judiciary is currently passing through a difficult and traumatic phase 
in its annals is quite obvious and certainly not in doubt. It is phase which is inevitably 
marked by deep loss of faith in the judicial process and the courts. Claims of ethnic 
lop-sidedness in the constitution of the Federal judiciary, serious allegations of 
corruption, ineptitude, laziness, incompetence against judicial officers, charges of 
abuse of office even against the Supreme Court judges.’64 
 
61 See for instance, the contradictory decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of the admissibility in evidence, 
of a registrable land instrument which has not been registered, in the cases of Abdullahi v Adetutu 2019 LPELR 
47384 (SC) and Benjamin v Kalio 2018 (15) NWLR (part 1641) 38 (SC). See also the conflicting decisions of the 
Supreme Court on the applicability of sections 96-98 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. 40 of 1945 to 
originating processes of the Federal High Court where such processes are to be served out of the state of issue, in 
the cases of Izeze v INEC 2018 LPELR 44284 (SC) and John Hingah Biem v SDP & 2 others (SC) unreported 
case SC/341/2019 of 14 May 2019. See further Enefiok Essien ‘Conflicting rationes decidendi: The dilemma of 
the lower courts in Nigeria (2000) 12 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 23; E.Q Okolie ‘A 
Critical Review of Conflicting Judgments of the Appellate Courts in Election Matters 
http://www.globalacademicgroup.com/journals/knowledge%20review/A%20CRITICAL%20REVIEW%20OF%2
0CONFLICTING%20JUDGEMENTS.pdf accessed on 7 August 2020. 
62 See the decision of the High Court of Lagos State in Global Gas and Refining Limited v The Shell Petroleum 
Development of Company Nigeria Ltd unreported case no LD/1910GCM/2017 of 25 February 2020 where the 
unsuccessful claimant  challenged the President of the arbitral tribunal on the grounds of bias. This allegation of 
bias was because the president acted as an expert witness at the quantum phase in a litigation involving a related 
entity of the respondent and testified about the position of Nigerian law on the assessment of damages. The 
Claimant took the view that the president might have been inclined to ‘compensate’ the respondent having 
previously testified against a related entity. The court, however, refused to consider the arguments relating to 
whether such an incident fell within the degrees of affinity that required disclosure under IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interests in International Commercial Arbitration 2004 and took the view that once an arbitrator is 
challenged, such an arbitrator must resign. See also Funke Adekoya ‘Global gas and refinery limited and Shell 
Petroleum Development Company Limited: Is Nigeria pro or anti-arbitration? The Lagos High Court says that 




on 7 August 2020. 
63 Gafar Idowu Ayodeji & Samuel Ibidapo Odukoya ‘Perception of judicial corruption: assessing its implications 
for democratic consolidation and sustainable development in Nigeria’ (2014) 16(2) Journal of Sustainable 
Development in Africa 67; A.O Enofe, B.O Ezeani and O.M Eichie ‘Perceptions of corruption in the Nigerian 
Judiciary’ (2015) 1(8) Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research 86. 
64 Ibrahim Abdulai ‘Independence of the judiciary in Nigeria: A myth or reality’ 2014 2(3) International Journal 
of Public Administration and Management Research 55-6; See also Bamgbose op cit note 59 at 21-3 
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 Solutions to the problems in the Nigerian judiciary can only be achieved in the long 
term. The remedy must entail far-reaching institutional reform including the entrenchment of 
a transparent appointment process that ensures that only deserving candidates make it to the 
bench and the phasing out of the corrupt and incompetent judges. These measures will likely 
take a long time to attain in the light of current realities. 
From all indications, Nigeria has not even begun the process of reforming the 
appointment process.65 Therefore, Nigeria cannot dispense with the ISDS framework for now. 
Indeed, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Aloma Muktar, has recognised the negative 
impact that the crisis in the judiciary could occasion for the inflow of foreign investments into 
the country.66 On this premise, Nigeria should retain the ISDS framework.  
Regarding the ICSID process, this dissertation considers measures to improve the 
efficacy of the process such as providing express consent to the ICSID Centre in legislation in 
addition to the existing treaties,67 the enforcement of provisional measures in aid of ICSID 
arbitration, and possibly improving the position of successful parties in ICSID Additional 
Facility arbitration by extending the application of the ICSID (Enforcement of Awards) Act to 
ICSID Additional Facility awards, in exercise of state legislative powers, rather than in 
fulfilment of Nigeria’s obligations under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, in order to 
improve the efficacy of ISDS process in Nigeria. 
These measures will ensure that a wider range of potential disputants have access to the 
ICSID system being a neutral and effective dispute resolution framework, thereby avoiding 
litigation in the Nigerian courts with its attendant challenges as discussed above. The outcome 
of such a dispute resolution mechanism, i.e. a final arbitral award, where there are no grounds 
 
65 See notes 59-60 above. 
66 Bamgbose op cit note 59 at 22. 
67 It is preferrable for consent to ICSID arbitration to be included in national legislation because Nigeria only has 
BITs with 15 countries but hosts investments from a number of important countries with which it has no BIT, 
chief among which are the United States and India. See United States Department of State ‘US Relations with 
Nigeria’ available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-
nigeria/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20the,destination%20in%20Sub%2DSaharan%20Africa last 
accessed on 13 November 2020; Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission ‘Indian Investments in Nigeria 
exceeds 15 billion dollars, says High Commissioner’ 28 January 2020 available at 
https://nipc.gov.ng/2020/01/28/indian-investments-in-nigeria-exceed-15-billion-dollars-says-high-
commissioner/ last accessed on 30 September 2020. See also the UK Department for International Development 
‘Nigeria Investment Guide 2020’ available https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/by-
country/nigeria/3091-nigeria-investment-guide-january-2020/file.html at page 19 last accessed on 3 October 
2020   Also, as shown in Chapter 3 of this work, several regional treaties either contain no provisions or unclear 
provisions for investor-state arbitration. In other words, Nigeria’s treaty framework is inadequate as the basis for 
consent to ICSID67 or even UNCITRAL arbitration because of the wide range of investors who do not have treaties 
with Nigeria. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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upon which same may be annulled, is enforceable directly at the Supreme Court,68 thereby 
avoiding the delay associated with post-arbitral award litigation69 in Nigeria.70 
The non-ICSID investment arbitration mechanism includes ad-hoc arbitration, usually 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and institutional arbitration rules such as those of the 
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), etc. A number of important reforms are 
required in respect of the non-ICSID mechanism being outside the self-contained ICSID 
process, especially in the area of court-ordered measures and post arbitral award litigation, i.e. 
applications for the setting aside and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 In essence, even where a dispute is to be resolved by arbitration, a party may require 
the aid of the courts for measures such as interim relief and enforcement or post arbitral award 
proceedings; hence, the courts are not always dispensable. The unique problems with 
enforcement mechanism under the New York Convention in Nigeria, together with other 
procedural problems in the Nigerian context, require reforms.71 This dissertation therefore 
examines reforms to make the ISDS system more effective in Nigeria. 
V. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is relevant for three key factors: (a) Questions have arisen about Nigeria’s 
investment climate recently having regard to a number of notable incidents; (b) Nigeria seeks 
to diversify its economy by attracting FDI and weaning itself off its overdependence on oil 
revenues; and (c) the ongoing efforts to amend the Arbitration Act and reform the country’s 
investment protection framework. 
(a) Questions about Nigeria’s investment climate in recent times 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is important to the economic growth of developing countries 
like Nigeria.72 In recognition of this, by the mid-1990s, Nigeria gradually shifted its policy 
from that of indigenisation and nationalisation of foreign-owned business ventures73 to one 
 
68 See section 1 of the ICSID (Enforcement of Awards) Act. 
69 Post arbitral award litigation refers to court proceedings relating to the enforcement and setting aside of 
arbitral awards. 
70 See section IV(b) of Chapter 4 below. 
71 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
72 Ogunleye Oyin The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment: Case Study Nigeria (Msc Thesis, University of Oulu, 
2014) 30, 39-46. 
73 See sections 4 and 5 of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 4 of 1972 which was infamously dubbed the 
Indigenisation Decree; See also Paul Collins ‘The political economy of indigenization: The case of the Nigerian 
enterprise promotion decree’ (1974) 4(4) African Review 494 and Ismaila Mohamed The Nigerian Enterprises 
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which strives to create an enabling environment for investment protection.74 Lately, however, 
Nigeria’s commitment to investment protection has been questioned due to certain 
developments. Three key incidents which have led to these concerns are worthy of discussion.  
The first of these incidents relates to the attempts by the government to adjust the 
revenue-sharing formula of the production-sharing contracts in the oil and gas industry - the 
most important sector of Nigeria’s economy - without due process of law. The oil-producing 
states wanted the federal government to increase its share of revenue under the various 
production-sharing contracts (PSC) with international oil companies (IOCs) in the oil and gas 
industry, with the ultimate objective of ensuring that the states receive a greater revenue 
allocation from the Federal Government. This increment was sought in accordance with section 
16(1) of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basing Production Sharing Contracts Act 26 of 1999 
(the PSC Act), which provides that the PSC Act shall be amended to adjust the revenue-sharing 
formula between parties to various PSCs, once the price of crude oil in the global market 
exceeds US$20 per barrel. The said adjustment is to be made to initiate an upward review of 
the government’s share of profits oil under the PSCs while the IOCs’ share of profit will be 
consequently reduced. 
However, instead of seeking legislative amendment at the National Assembly to effect 
the amendment of the PSC Act, the Attorney-Generals of the oil-producing states instituted 
action at the Supreme Court to compel the executive arm of government to amend the PSC Act 
to increase the government’s share of the revenue under the PSC.75 Subsequently, the parties 
to the action reached an out of court settlement agreement on the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the PSC Act and for the government’s shares of revenue to be adjusted 
accordingly. Following the execution of the settlement agreement, the parties successfully 
applied to the Supreme Court for this settlement agreement to be entered as a consent 
judgment.76  
 
Promotion Decrees (1972 and 1977) and Indigenization in Nigeria (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Warwick, 1985) 58-65. 
74 See the preamble to the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 16 of 1995 and generally, the Foreign 
Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 17 of 1995.  
75 See Attorney General of Rivers & Others v Attorney General of the Federation 2019 (1) NWLR (part 1652) 
53(SC). The suit was commenced at the Supreme Court in the original jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section 
232(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 which confers original jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court in respect of disputes between the states and the federation. As a result of this, other interested 
parties in the suit were unable to join. 
76 Ibid. A consent judgment is one entered by a court pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties to a dispute 
and constitutes a final judgment of court which may only be appealed with leave of court. See section 241(2)(c) 
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Because of the potentially adverse effect of this action on their commercial interests, 
the IOCs77 applied to join the suit on the ground that they would be affected by the outcome.78 
They also contended that the suit ought not to be heard in the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court because hearing of the suit by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction would potentially lead to the exclusion of interested non-government parties, as 
the original jurisdiction can only be exercised in respect of disputes between the state 
governments or a state government and the federal government.79 The Supreme Court however 
rejected this application and proceeded to enter the consent judgment.80 
This attempt to unilaterally amend the terms of the PSCs led to the commencement of 
ad hoc arbitration proceedings by the IOCs.81 The move was perceived as an attempt by the 
government to increase the share of revenues due to it under the PSCs in the oil and gas industry 
without due process of law82 for several reasons. 
 First, the legal correctness of the Supreme Court is questionable.83 Secondly, the 
unilateral amendment of the contract to increase the share of government revenues 
retrospectively appeared to be an act of indirect expropriation especially where the 
government’s previous conduct indicated that it had elected not to amend the PSC Act. There 
was therefore a legitimate expectation that it had waived its potential increased earnings for 
those years.  
The second key incident appeared to be a breach of the guarantee of free transferability 
of funds relating to investment. A dispute arose as to whether MTN Nigeria Communications 
Plc (MTN) had repatriated funds to South Africa between 2007 and 2015 in contravention of 
regulatory requirements in the financial sector. Consequently, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); See also Afegbai v Attorney General 
of Edo State 2001 (33) WRN 29(SC). 
77 The IOCs applied to join the suit through the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
78In Re Lagos Chamber of Commerce & Industry 2019 (1) NWLR (part 1652) 91. 
79 Section 232(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 
80 See Attorney General of Rivers & Others v Attorney General of the Federation 2019 (1) NWLR (part 1652) 53 
at 71 (SC); Re Lagos Chamber of Commerce & Industry 2019 (1) NWLR (part 1652) 91 at 95-6 (SC). 
81 This started with suits commenced for interim orders of protection pending the commencement of arbitration. 
See for instance CNOOC Exploration and Production Limited & Anor v NNPC & Others (FHC) unreported case 
FHC/L/CS/158/2019. 
82 See for example Templars ‘A coup against PSC contractors? Re: Attorney General of Rivers State & 2 Others 
v Attorney General of Federation: Impending Review of Nigeria’s PSC Act’ available at https://www.templars-
law.com/a-coup-against-psc-contractors-re-attorney-general-of-rivers-state-2-others-v-attorney-general-of-the-
federation-impending-review-of-nigeria-psc-act/ last accessed on 3 October 2020. 
83 This is because it is the duty of the court to interpret statutes especially mandatory provisions of same, hence it 
is submitted that parties to a dispute cannot enter into an agreement as to how a court should interpret a statute, 
especially one which confers a duty on a public authority. 
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(CBN) directed MTN to repay the repatriated funds into its Nigerian bank accounts.84 The CBN 
subsequently realised that it had reached its decision erroneously and reversed same.85 
Thirdly, at the regional level, the Lagos State government imposed a ban on motorcycle 
taxis (locally known as okadas) in several important local government areas in the state86 only 
months after the government had announced that such transportation solutions would be 
incorporated in developing a holistic transportation framework to address the transportation 
challenges in the state.87 The move negatively affected motorcycle start-up companies, 
including some foreign-owned ones like Gokada, and raised questions about the investment 
climate in Nigeria, especially after the Lagos State government had by its conduct encouraged 
the motorcycle start-ups to invest in the state and given assurances that the motorcycle taxi 
solution would be incorporated into the state’s transportation system.88 
(b) Decline in oil prices and urgent need for diversification of the economy 
Nigeria plunged into a deep economic recession in 2016 following the crash in global oil 
prices.89 Oil is Nigeria’s most important export and primary source of foreign revenue hence 
the crash of oil prices from US$115 in June 2014 to about US$31 in January 2016, led to a 
devaluation of the naira with attendant economic problems.90 At the time, there was little hope 
 
84 MTN Group eventually reached a settlement with the Central Bank of Nigeria on the issue. MTN provided 
additional document which persuaded CBN to agree that MTN was no longer required to repatriate the transferred 
funds as initially directed. See Carin Smith ‘MTN settles with Nigerian central bank on $8.1bn dispute’ 
Fin 24 27 December 2018 available at https://www.fin24.com/Companies/ICT/mtn-settles-with-nigerian-central-
bank-on-81bn-dispute-20181227 accessed on 27 December 2019 at 16:52; See also Babatunde Ogunleye ‘The 
Dynamics of Foreign Investment Flows in Nigeria’ Stears Business 1 May 2018 available at 
https://www.stearsng.com/article/the-dynamics-of-foreign-investment-flows-in-nigeria last accessed on 27 
September 2020. 
85 Ibid. 
86Oluwatosin Adeshokan ‘Lagos motorcycle ban hits digital ride firms, chills investor climate’ 
The Africa Report 3 February 2020 available at https://www.theafricareport.com/22846/lagos-motorcycle-ban-
hits-digital-ride-firms-chills-investor-climate/ accessed on 8 August 2020. 
 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51353665 
87 Nzekwe Henry ‘MAX.ng reveals how govt broke its its own law and promises with recent Okada ban which 
could tank E-Hailing start-ups’ Weetracker 30 January 2020 available at 
https://weetracker.com/2020/01/30/max-ng-faults-lagos-okada-ban/ accessed on 8 August 2020.  
88 Ibid. See also the Speech of Governor Babajide Sanwo Olu of Lagos State at The Platform Nigeria on 1 October 
2019 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3qzMw_CcfU last accessed on 3 October 2020. 
89 Godwin Emefiele ‘From Recession to Growth: The Story of Nigeria’s Recovery from the 2016 Economic 
Recession’ paper delivered at the Special Convocation of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, on May 17, 2019 
90 Ibid, the country’s economic projections and budgetary plans are usually dependent on the price of crude oil in 
the global market hence fluctuations in price often directly affect the economy. See Ibrahim Alley, Ayodele 
Asekomeh, Hakeem Mobolaji et al ‘Oil Price Shocks and Nigerian Economic Growth’ (2014) 10(19) European 
Scientific Journal 375 at 381,387; Adeleke Omolade, Harold Ngalawa & Adebayo Kutu ‘Crude oil price shocks 
and macroeconomic performance in Africa’s oil-producing countries’ (2019) 7(1) Cogent Economics & Finance 
1607431 13-14 1607431 available at 




that oil prices would rise again in the near future because of the abundant supply of crude oil 
in the global market. It became apparent that the government could not continue to defer the 
requisite steps because of the need to diversify the economy. The COVID-19 crisis has further 
deepened the country’s economic woes.91 
A shift from the overdependence on crude oil cannot not be achieved overnight. The 
diversification of the economy is a long-term solution.92 The country is, however, yet to fully 
recover from the resultant economic problems of the recession, especially the depreciation of 
the naira. The COVID-19 pandemic and its effects have further deepened the country’s 
economic woes.93 The immediate solutions appear to be the attraction of foreign direct 
investment and the amendment of tax statutes to increase tax revenue.94  
In demonstrating a commitment towards attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), a 
state needs to create an enabling environment for the protection of such investment. The 
following remarks by Akinsanya state the point of view of the investor quite succinctly: 
‘…private investors invest to make profits and not for reasons of benevolence. Thus, if they 
make profits, they expect albeit not unnaturally to keep them, subject to payment of appropriate 
taxes to the local authorities; if they acquire property, they expect to be entitled to keep it. The 
feeling of insecurity in these respects is perhaps the major deterrent to the flow of direct foreign 
investment in less developed countries.’95 
The concern highlighted in the above quote cannot be overstated as the country seeks to attract 
FDI. These concerns are further magnified when one considers the mixed signals from the 
government of Nigeria. On the one hand, in its bid to attract foreign investment, President 
Muhammadu Buhari established the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council 
(PEBEC) to remove ‘bureaucratic constraints to doing business in Nigeria and make the 
 
91 The World Bank Press Release No: 2020/154/Afr Nigeria’s economy faces worst recession in four decades, 
says New World Bank Report available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2020/06/25/nigerias-economy-faces-worst-recession-in-four-decades-says-new-world-bank-report 
accessed on 8 August 2020. 
92 PWC ‘Nigeria's economic recovery Defining the path for economic growth’ November 2017. Available at 
https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/press-room/nigerias-economic-recovery.html accessed on 8 August 2020. 
93 The World Bank Press Release No: 2020/154/Afr Nigeria’s economy faces worst recession in four decades, 
says New World Bank Report available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2020/06/25/nigerias-economy-faces-worst-recession-in-four-decades-says-new-world-bank-report 
accessed on 8 August 2020. 
94 The government amended various tax statutes by the enactment of the Finance Act 1 of 2019. See also Dike 
Onwuamaeze & Nume Ekeghe ‘Nigeria: No going back on aggressive tax drive, govt insists’ Thisday 23 
September 2019 available at https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/09/23/no-going-back-on-aggressive-
tax-drive-fg-insists/ accessed on 8 August 2020.  
95 Adeoye Akinsanya, ‘International protection of direct foreign investment in the third world’ (1987)36 Int’l 
Comp. L Q 58.  
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country a progressively easier place to start and grow a business’.96 Also, the President signed 
the new Companies and Allied Matters Act - which contains a number of innovations to 
improve the ease of doing business in Nigeria - into law on 7 August 2020. On the other hand, 
the Nigerian government has previously taken actions like closing the borders to regional trade 
and the attempted to increase its revenue in the oil and gas industry through what can be 
described as the ‘backdoor’ as explained above. 
(c) The need for a more effective investment dispute resolution framework 
The inefficient judicial system and unreliable dispute settlement mechanisms in Nigeria have 
been cited as barriers to FDI in Nigeria.97 The improvement of the legal framework for the 
resolution of investments is therefore an important step in creating a healthy investment 
climate.98 In view of the recent incidents which have called into question the friendliness of 
Nigeria’s investment climate, country-specific reforms to the ISDS framework to enhance the 
dispute resolution process in Nigeria will be instrumental in creating a healthy investment 
climate. 
 Obstacles inhibiting the efficacy of the arbitral process, especially at the enforcement 
stage in Nigeria, are worth exploring. This is because the arbitration process in Nigeria, 
especially outside the ICSID mechanism, is often the first stage of what is usually a two-stage 
dispute resolution process which entails both arbitration and litigation in instances where the 
unsuccessful party in the arbitration decides to challenge the award or resist the enforcement 
of same. In essence, even where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration, arbitration is 
typically the first stage of the two-stage process. The parties participate in arbitration as the 
first stage, and then litigate the second stage by way of enforcement and or setting aside 
proceedings with the attendant problems. Enforcement and setting aside proceedings are not 
exempt from the delays other litigation matters have been known to suffer.99 
 
96 See PEBEC Website https://easeofdoingbusinessnigeria.com/about-us/the-mandate accessed on 6 January 
2020.  
97 Nordea ‘Nigeria: Investing in Nigeria’ available at: https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-
market/nigeria/investment#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20UNCTAD%202020,98%2C6%20billion%20in
%202019. accessed on 9 August 2020. 
98 O.A Odiase-Alegimenlen ‘An appraisal of foreign investment promotion and protection measures operating in 
Nigeria’ (2002) 3(2) Journal of World Investment 345 at 353,361-2. 
99 Olatinuolawa Fagboyegun Enforcement of Foreign Investment Awards in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Oil and 
Gas Industry (unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2016) 52-4. 
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 The Amendment Bill to the Arbitration Act, which was passed by the Nigerian Senate 
in 2018, addresses some of the inadequacies with Nigeria’s arbitration framework.100 Other 
issues such as the enforcement of provisional measures in support of ICSID arbitration, small 
investment claims, and delay in enforcement proceedings among others are explored to propose 
solutions that ensure that potential disputants are afforded an effective ISDS framework.  
 While this dissertation argues that arbitration process is preferrable to litigation in 
Nigeria, the courts are often indispensable in the dispute resolution process. The reason for this 
seemingly contradictory position is that even where arbitration has been chosen, a party may 
require the assistance of a court in the arbitral process for measures such as the enforcement of 
interim relief and preservation of evidence. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the arbitration, a 
successful party may have to apply to court for the recognition and enforcement of the award 
where the losing party does not comply with the award willingly. However, in granting such 
remedies, the court is less involved with the consideration of the merits of the dispute than it 
would be if the dispute was submitted to it, hence the position may not be as diametrical as it 
may appear.  
VI. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary objective of this research is to examine Nigeria’s investment arbitration 
framework to identify the key challenges inhibiting the efficiency of the system in the Nigerian 
context and making proposals to address same. This dissertation examines key aspects of the 
statutes, conventions, and treaties relating to both the ICSID and non-ICSID investment 
arbitration framework especially as it relates to court-ordered measures, post-arbitral award 
litigation,101 and other innovations aimed at improving the ISDS framework in Nigeria. 
 
 
VII. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In light of the issues highlighted in the background to the study, what are the inadequacies in 
Nigeria’s current ISDS framework and what possible reforms can be made to provide a more 
efficient legal regime? 
 
100 The president is yet to sign the bill into law. 
101 Arguably, reforms in these areas will also improve the effectiveness of Nigeria-seated institutional investor-
state arbitration under rules such as the ICC, LCIA etc. 
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VIII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
RESEARCH 
The dissertation uses a doctrinal methodology examining primary and secondary sources. 
While the primary sources include statutes, treaties, arbitration rules, official documents of key 
institutions, and participants in the process and cases, the secondary sources comprise of books, 
journals, newspaper articles, conference papers, working papers, speeches, lectures, webinars, 
and relevant internet sources. 
This work is divided into six chapters as follows: Chapter 1 provides an introductory study of 
the concept of investor-state arbitration and the background of the study. This chapter also 
contains the research question and the objectives of the dissertation. Chapter 2 contains a 
detailed discourse of the statutory framework for the conduct of investor-state arbitration in 
Nigeria. This chapter examines important legislation primarily the NIPC Act, ICSID Act, and 
the Arbitration Act. Chapter 3 discusses the treaty framework for ISDS in Nigeria. Chapter 4 
identifies key inadequacies of Nigeria’s ISDS legal framework while Chapter 5 contains 
proposals that should be adopted in dealing with the challenges identified in the preceding 
















 THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN 
NIGERIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the statutory framework for the conduct of investor-state arbitration in 
Nigeria. Like commercial arbitration, the jurisdiction of investment disputes is based on the 
consent of the parties.102 Apart from treaties and investment agreements, the consent of the 
government to the process is sometimes contained in statutes. Where the consent of the 
government is based on statutes, such consent is often expressed in the form of a standing offer 
which the investor may accept by filing a claim.103  
An important component of Nigeria’s statutory framework for investor-state arbitration 
is Nigeria’s consent to the ICSID Centre as contained in statute. This chapter also evaluates 
important statutes relating to the non-ICSID process, especially ad hoc arbitration, judicial 
measures in support of the arbitral process, and the enforcement of final awards. The principal 
investment arbitration legislation104 are discussed in this chapter: (i) the NIPC Act; (ii) the 
ICSID (Enforcement of Awards) Act; and (iii) the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
II. THE NIGERIAN INVESTMENT PROTECTION COMMISSION ACT 16 OF 1995 
a. Objectives of the NIPC Act 
The Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission Act 16 of 1995 (the NIPC Act)105 was enacted 
by the Federal Military Government in 1995 to create a legal framework for investment 
protection and promotion in Nigeria and to establish the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission as a statutory body for the regulation of foreign investment in the country. The 
 
102 See for instance Giovanni Alemanni and others v Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility 17 November 2014, para 305. See also Andrea Marco Steingruber Consent in 
International Arbitration (2012) ch.11; Derain & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at 42-3; Dugan et al op cit note 8 
at 219-20. 
103 Jan Paulsson ‘Arbitration without privity’ (1995) 10(2) ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 232 
at 234-35. 
104 There are also a number of sector-specific statutes such as the Petroleum Act 51 of 1969, which provide that 
disputes in those sectors shall be resolved by arbitration and the Nigeria LNG (Fiscal, Guarantees and Assurances) 
Act 39 of 1990 which contains Nigeria’s consent to arbitration in disputes in the liquified natural gas sector. Those 
statutes are excluded because they are industry specific and do not usually give rise to much controversy. 
105 This was originally enacted as the Nigerian Investment Promotion Decree 16 of 1995. By sections 6(6)(d) and 
315(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, decrees passed by the Federal Military 




NIPC Act remains one of the most important pieces of legislation for investment arbitration in 
Nigeria, despite the flaws contained in its dispute resolution provisions. 
b. Scope and application of the Act 
The NIPC Act applies to both local and foreign investment. It also sets out a negative list of 
sectors in which investors may not invest.106 Notably, the Act contains investment guarantees 
such as unconditional transferability of funds relating to investment,107 and non-expropriation 
of enterprise except for public purposes and with the prompt payment of compensation.108  
However, the NIPC Act is not a comprehensive investment protection statute as four of 
the usual investment guarantees - fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, 
national treatment, and most favoured nation treatment - are absent.  
The NIPC Act removes the restrictions on the ownership of shares in Nigerian 
enterprises imposed by previous statutes.109 The legislation also seeks to regulate foreign 
investment by prescribing what enterprises of the Nigerian economy foreign investors are 
eligible to participate in,110 although most key sectors of the economy are open to foreign 
investors.  
The NIPC Act provides that no foreigner may participate in business in Nigeria unless 
such an enterprise is incorporated or registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
in Nigeria.111 In turn, such companies with foreign participation must register with the Nigeria 
Investment Promotion Commission.112 Furthermore, section 31 defines an enterprise with 
foreign participation as one duly registered with the NIPC. 
 Registration with the NIPC is vital. Arguably, only foreign owned enterprises duly 
registered can take advantage of the protection afforded by the Act. Furthermore, if a company 
 
106 Sections 18 and 31 of the NIPC Act. These are sectors not generally open to the public eg the production of 
arms, ammunition, military uniforms etc. 
107 Ibid at Section 24. 
108 Ibid at Section 25. 
109 This is in contrast to the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree which contained a list of a commercial ventures 
exclusively reserved for Nigerians. Expatriates were however allowed to invest in those business activities if the 
nominal share capital of the company was N20,000,000 or more. See generally Khrushchev Ekwueme ‘Nigeria’s 
principal investment laws in the context of international law and practice’ 49 (2) Journal of African Law 179. 
110 Sections 17, 18 and 31 of the NIPC Act. 
111 See section 19(1) of the NIPC Act. 
112 Section 20 of the NIPC Act. 
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is not registered with the NIPC, such an enterprise would be carrying on business in Nigeria 
illegally and therefore ineligible to take advantage of the guarantees provided by the Act.113  
c. Definition of ‘foreign investor’ 
The NIPC Act does not define who a foreign investor is for the purposes of section 26 (2) and 
(3) of the NIPC Act. One possible drawback of this lacuna, especially in view of the dispute 
resolution provisions of the NIPC Act, is that a company with a majority Nigerian shareholding 
and only a negligible foreign shareholding may seek to take advantage of the ICSID mechanism 
pursuant to section 26(2),(b),(c) and (3) because it is a foreign investor.  
Having regard to the provision of sections 20 of the NIPC Act which makes registration 
with the NIPC compulsory for companies with foreign participation, it is arguable that a foreign 
investor for the dispute resolution provisions of the NIPC Act is a Nigerian registered company 
with majority foreign shareholding and duly registered with the NIPC.  
Furthermore, if this contention arises before an ICSID tribunal, the tribunal would 
likely adopt a purposive interpretation of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention114 and 
resolve the question by inquiring into the controlling interest of the company.115 
d. Definition of ‘investment’ 
It is also important to consider what qualifies as an investment under the NIPC Act because of 
its significance for jurisdiction. An investment claim can only be brought in respect of a dispute 
relating to an ‘investment’ as defined by a treaty, investment agreement or an investment 
 
113 Compliance with an investment legislation which imposes conditions precedent is important because in 
investment arbitration practice, jurisdictional objections have been raised against investor-state arbitral 
proceedings on the ground of non-compliance with domestic law. See for instance, Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport 
Services Worldwide v Philippines(II) ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12, Award dispatched on 10 December 2014, para 
444, 461-468, where the tribunal dismissed Fraport’s claim for being inadmissible on the ground that it breached 
a constitutional rule and the Anti-Dummy Law of the Philippines which restricted the operation of public utilities 
to Philippine citizens or Philippine corporations with at least 60 per cent of the share capital owned by Philippine 
citizens. 
114 Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention contemplates two definitions of nationality in respect of juridical 
persons for the purpose of filing an ICSID claim. The first relates to juridical persons who had the nationality of 
a contracting state other than the State party against which the claim has been filed. The second, which is relevant 
here, is that which states that ‘any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national 
of another contracting state for this Convention.’ The NIPC Act recognises that companies registered with the 
NIPC are companies with foreign participation and by incorporating the ICSID mechanism at section 26(3) of the 
NIPC Act, it is arguable that the Nigerian government recognises such companies may possess possessing the 
nationality of other ICSID Convention states. 
115 See for example National Gas SAE v Egypt ICSID Case Arb/11/7, award dispatched on 3 April 2004, para 
122-149, where the tribunal upheld an objection that an Egypt incorporated claimant could not be treated as a 
foreign investor due to the foreign control clause in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention because the 
company in question was controlled by an Egyptian national.  
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protection statute.116 Moreover, an ICISD tribunal will only assume jurisdiction over an 
investment dispute rather than a commercial one.117 
 The definition of investment in the NIPC Act is unclear and tautological. ‘Investment’ 
is defined in the NIPC Act as: ‘investments made to acquire an interest in an enterprise 
operating within and outside the economy of Nigeria’. Reading the above definition of 
investment together with the definition of ‘enterprise’ provides more clarity as to what would 
qualify as ‘investment’ under the Act. Section 31 defines ‘enterprise’ as: 
‘…an industry, project, undertaking, business to which this Decree applies or an expansion of 
that industry, undertaking, project or any part of that industry, undertaking, project or business 
and, where there is foreign participation, means such an enterprise duly registered with the 
Commission.’ 
The effect of the combined reading of the definitions of enterprise and investment as contained 
in section 31 of the NIPC Act is that the definition of ‘investment’ in the NIPC Act is broader 
than the ambit of investment as expounded in several landmark cases.118  
ICSID tribunals have sought to give a narrow definition to the concept as the ICSID 
Convention itself does not define the term.119 Although these definitions as contained in arbitral 
awards are not binding on subsequent tribunals because of the absence of stare decisis in 
arbitration, they serve as a guide in defining the concept120 and indeed, the test has been 
followed by many tribunals.121  
 Perhaps the landmark case on this issue is Salini Construttori SpA and another v 
Morocco,122 where the tribunal considered the question of whether a construction contract 
could be considered an ‘investment’ within the contemplation of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. A government-owned company, Societe Nationale des Autoroutes du Maroc 
 
116 Felix Okpe ‘The definition of investment and the ICSID convention: matters arising under the Nigerian 
investment promotion act and international investment law’ (2017) 18(2) Afe Babalola University: Journal of 
Sustainable Development Law and Policy 134 at 149-51. 
117 See Salini Construttori SpA and Anor v Morocco ICSID Case No. Arb/004/4. Decision on jurisdiction 23 July 
2001. 
118 Salini v Morocco (supra); Consorzio Groupement LESI Dipenta v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
ICSID Case No. Arb/03/8; Phoenix v Czech Republic ICSID Case No.ARB/06/5. 
119 One of the drafts leading to the final version of the Convention had proposed a definition of ‘investment’ as 
follows: ‘any contribution of money or other or other assets of economic value for an indefinite period or, if the 
period be defined, for not less than five years.’ See Christoph Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch et 
al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2 ed (2009) 115. 
120 Derains & Sicard-Mirabel op cit note 1 at 25-27 and Lim et al note 1 at 211-30 explain the distinction between 
the subjective and objective approaches to the meaning of protected investments. 
121 See Salini v Morocco decision on jurisdiction 23 July 2001 para 44-64: Consorzio Groupement LESI-Dipenta 
v Republic of Algeria ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8. decision on jurisdiction,10 January 2005 para 13-15. 
122 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
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(‘ADM’) acting on behalf of the Moroccan government had concluded a concession agreement 
with the claimants, two Italian-owned companies, Salini and Italstrades SpA for the 
construction of a highway between Rabat and Fes. Upon conclusion of the construction project, 
ADM refused to make the final payments due to the claimants as a result of which the 
arbitration was instituted. 
The Italian government objected to the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal on the ground 
that the claims were for breach of contract and that same did not arise out of a violation of a 
BIT and did not relate to an investment as contemplated by Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. While noting that there had been few instances in which a controversy had arisen 
on the question of whether a venture amounted to an investment,123 the tribunal considered a 
number of factors namely: (a) contributions; (b) a certain duration of performance of the 
contract; and (c) participation in the risks of the transaction and a contribution to the economic 
development of the host state. The tribunal found that all these elements were present in this 
case and accordingly held that the claims amounted to an investment as contemplated by 
Article 25 of ICSID Convention and the relevant BIT.124 
In view of the wide language employed by the NIPC Act in its definition of the concept 
of investment, the NIPC Act appears to offer an investor a wider protection in respect of 
activities that would qualify as investments than what is typically contained in treaty. This 
position may give rise to controversy especially where the tribunal has to determine the 
question of whether the dispute relates to an investment on the basis of the NIPC Act because 
there is no treaty between the home state of the investor and Nigeria.125 
The employment of  such broad wording to include  activities which may qualify as 
commercial transactions in defining the term, ‘investment’ was the subject of controversy in 
 
123 The tribunal noted that with the exception of the decision of the Secretary General of ICSID refusing to register 
a request for arbitration in respect of a dispute which arose out of a simple sale, previous awards had rarely dealt 
with the question of investment. See IFI Shihata and AR Parra ‘The Experience of the international Centre for 
Investment Disputes’ (1999) 14(2) ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 308. Note, however, the case 
of Fedax N.V v The Republic of Venezuela ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 where the tribunal observed that an 
investment is characterised by ‘a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, a 
substantial commitment and a significance for the host state’s development’. 
124 Schreuer et al op cit note 119 at 128 identify five tests for ascertaining whether a venture qualifies as an 
‘investment’ namely: (a) the duration of the venture or enterprise, (b) regularity of profit and return, (c) assumption 
of risk, (d) substantial commitment of resources, and (e) significance for the host state’s development. It is also 
important to note that the Salini test has not always been followed. See Lim et al op cit note 1 at 222-23 
125 See for example the case of Romak v Uzbekistan PCA Case No. AA280, where the tribunal observed that a 
state may deem any form of asset or economic transaction including one-off sales contracts as investments, 
provided the wording of the relevant instrument leaves no doubt as to the intention to designate such commercial 
ventures as investment. See also Schreuer et al op cit note 119 at 122. 
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Malaysia Historical Salvors SDN BHD v Malaysia.126 In this case, the claim was brought on 
the basis of the UK-Malaysia BIT. Article 1(1)(a) of the BIT defines ‘investment’ and includes 
the following items: 
Every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:  
… 
(iii) Claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; 
    (iv)    Intellectual property rights and goodwill; 
(v)     Business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to 
search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.      
           
The investor brought the claim for payment due under a marine salvage contract. Malaysia 
challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the ground that such a contract did not constitute 
a protected investment under Article 1(1)(a) of the BIT. Without referring to the said provision, 
the arbitrator found that the marine salvage contract did not possess the characteristics of a 
protected investment. 
 The investor applied to annul the decision on jurisdiction.127 The annulment committee 
annulled the award on the ground that the sole arbitrator failed to consider the definition of 
investment under Article 1(1)(a) of the BIT. The committee explained that notwithstanding the 
applicability of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, Article 1(1)(a) of the BIT was the primary 
consideration for determining whether the marine salvage contract was a protected investment. 
 It will therefore appear that the definition of investment in a treaty or statute may be 
upheld by a tribunal even if it falls short of the Salini test. This position is preferable and 
accords with the obligations of a state to honour its treaty obligations and domestic laws. 
Conversely, a state may choose to restrict the scope of its submission to ISDS, to only 
investment claims as defined in Salini to avoid opening the floodgates to sundry commercial 
claims. 
While it has been said that the definition of investment in treaty provisions will override 
that of national investment legislation,128 the availability of a more favourable definition in 
legislation that does not contradict a treaty may not pose any problems. In the light of decisions 
such as Romak v Uzbekistan and MHS v Malaysia, it is likely that a tribunal may give effect to 
a wider definition like the one in section 31 the NIPC Act which may be more favourable to a 
potential claimant. 
 
126 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10. Award on jurisdiction 17 May 2007 para 146. 
127 MHS v Malaysia, decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009, para 80. 
128 See Okpe op cit note 116 at 149. 
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Furthermore, where the home state of an investor has a BIT with Nigeria which contains 
an umbrella clause,129 it may be argued that such an umbrella clause may have the effect of 
extending the category of ventures that would qualify as an investment to include those that 
fall within the broader definition of section 31 of the NIPC Act. This is because umbrella 
clauses typically extend the obligations of the government beyond treaty protection to include 
a requirement to honour contractual and other obligations;130 the duty of government to honour 
legitimate obligations includes abiding by its own laws. However, where there is a less 
favourable definition in legislation than what a treaty provides, by Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, the provision of the treaty ought to prevail. 
If a foreign investor brings a claim which lacks the attributes of an investments as 
defined in cases like Salini against Nigeria on the basis of the NIPC Act, an ICSID tribunal 
may assume jurisdiction depending on how such a tribunal interprets the broad definition of 
investment contained in section 31 of the NIPC Act. In taking a position against such broad 
definitions, it has been held that there is a limit to how much parties can define the concept of 
investment for the purpose of ICSID jurisdiction.131However, having regard to the lack of stare 
decisis in arbitration, it is uncertain if a tribunal will always be swayed by the prevalent position 
of ICSID jurisprudence on the definition of investment in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. 
e. Dispute resolution provisions 
Section 26 of the NIPC Act provides for dispute resolution between the investor and the State. 
Section 26(1) generally provides that where a dispute arises between an investor and the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, such a dispute shall be resolved amicably. The provision of 
section 26(1) applies to both local and foreign investors.  
Section 26(2) provides for the procedure to be adopted if parties fail to reach an 
amicable resolution of an investment dispute. Section 26(2)(a) contains Nigeria’s express 
consent to domestic arbitration in respect of local investors. Section 26(2)(b) and (c) deal with 
 
129 See for example Article 3(5) of the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT. 
130 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 349-350. Article 3(5) of the Romania-Nigeria BIT which provides that ‘each 
contracting party shall observe any obligation it has assumed regarding investments in its State territory by 
investors of the other Contracting Party’ Interestingly Article 3(4) provides that ‘if State Legislation of either 
Contracting Party entitles investment by investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment more favourable 
than is provided for by this Agreement, such legislation shall, to the extent that it is more favourable, prevail over 
this Agreement’. 
131 Joy Mining v Egypt ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on jurisdiction 6 August 2004, para 50 
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the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the Nigerian government. Section 
26(2)(b) and (c) provide as follows: 
(2) Any dispute between an investor and any Government of the Federation in respect of an 
enterprise to which this Act applies which is not amicably settled through mutual discussions, 
may be submitted at the option of the aggrieved party to arbitration as follows: 
(b) in the case of a foreign investor, within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral 
agreement on investment protection to which the Federal Government and the country of which 
the investor is a national are parties; or 
(c) in accordance with any other national or international machinery for the settlement of 
investment disputes agreed on by the parties. 
It is clear from section 26(2)(b) and (c) that where a bilateral or multilateral agreement or treaty 
exists between the Federal Government and the home state of an investor, recourse will be 
made to the dispute resolution clause of such a BIT or MIT in resolving a dispute between the 
investor and Nigeria. Such a dispute resolution clause may provide for ICSID arbitration or 
UNCITRAL arbitration as a number of Nigeria’s treaties do. When there is a treaty that 
provides for ICSID arbitration, the provision of such a treaty may be treated as Nigeria’s 
standing offer to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre as contemplated by Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention. 
It is also important to note that while Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention only 
requires consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID to be in writing, an ICSID tribunal has held that 
consent to ICSID jurisdiction must be explicit and not to be deduced or construed from the 
conduct of the parties in a given situation,132 hence questions may arise as to the adequacy of 
the conditional consent of the Nigerian government to the ICSID Centre as contained in section 
26(3) of the NIPC Act. Section 26(3) of the NIPC Act provides as follows: 
…where in respect of any dispute, there is disagreement between the investor and the Federal 
Government of Nigeria as to the method of dispute settlement to be adopted, the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules shall apply. 
From the above, it is clear that section 26(3) of the NIPC Act does not contain Nigeria’s express 
consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre but one which is conditional upon a 
disagreement between a foreign investor and Nigeria as to the mode of dispute resolution. In 
essence, where there is an investment treaty between the home state of the investor and Nigeria, 
or other agreement which provides for the resolution of disputes through other means apart 
from ICSID, the Nigerian government may contend   ̶and rightly so, it is submitted  ̶ that parties 
 
132 See for instance Cable Television of Nevis Ltd and Another v St. Kitts and Nevis ICSID Case No. ARB/95/2 
Award, 13 January 1997; See also Schruer et al op cit note 119 at 191. 
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have agreed on how to resolve their disputes and that there is no disagreement as to the mode 
of dispute resolution so as to trigger the conditional consent contained in section 26(3) of the 
NIPC Act. 
This position may have practical relevance to Chinese investors who have significant 
investments in Nigeria but whose BIT with Nigeria does not provide for ICSID arbitration. In 
the absence of an investment agreement which provides for ICSID arbitration, a Chinese 
investor who desires to resolve his dispute through the ICSID mechanism because of the 
advantage of direct enforceability of awards at the Supreme Court if successful, amongst other 
advantages, will be unable to do so. This is because in such an instance, there is an agreement 
– i.e. the China-Nigeria BIT ̶   between the parties on the resolution of disputes hence the 
condition for the applicability of section 26(3) is absent.  
In essence, once there is a treaty between parties on the resolution of disputes, or  some 
other investment agreement, by section 26(2)(b) and (c), recourse will be had to such a treaty 
or agreement and the conditional consent in section 26(3) will not be available. This argument 
may be extended to any investor whose home state is a party to an investment treaty with 
Nigeria, which provides for the resolution of investment disputes but makes no provision for 
ICSID arbitration.  
  The question of whether the provisions of section 26(2) and (3) of the NIPC Act 
amount to the consent of the Nigerian government to the ICSID Centre, arose in the case of 
Interocean Oil & Development Company and Interocean Oil Exploration Company v Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.133 The respondent raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
Centre on the ground, inter alia, that mere reference to the ICSID rules at section 26(3) of the 
NIPC Act does not necessarily signify the consent of the Nigerian government to the ICSID 
Centre.  
However, this objection was unsuccessful because the tribunal held that it was not 
‘plausible in law or in practice’ to read the reference to the ICSID Rules at section 26(3) of the 
NIPC Act, as only indicative of the procedural rules to be applied. The tribunal further held 
that although section 26(3) merely refers to the ICSID Rules, there are no standalone ICSID 
Rules and that the ICSID Convention, ICSID Arbitration Rules, ICSID Institution rules, and 
 
133 ICSID Case No. ARB/13/20. 
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ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations govern different stages and aspects of ICSID 
proceedings.134 
The position of the tribunal in Interocean above is convincing for a number of reasons. 
First, in the absence of a BIT or MIT between the US and Nigeria, which provides for dispute 
resolution, that the claimant, an American owned company, could have relied on to commence 
arbitration against Nigeria135 further to section 26(2)(b) or (c) of the NIPC Act, they were 
qualified candidates eligible to take advantage of the conditional consent at section 26(3) of 
the NIPC Act.  
It is however important to point out that the provisions of section 26(2)(b) and (c) alone 
do not amount to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre as contemplated by Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention. This is because while section 26(2)(b) provides that a dispute shall 
be resolved within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment 
protection to which the federal government and the investor’s home state are parties, such a 
general reference to treaties and conventions which does make a specific reference to the ICSID 
Centre or Convention is insufficient for ICSID jurisdiction. This is because membership of the 
ICSID Convention alone is insufficient as consent to ICSID jurisdiction; a separate agreement 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre is required.136  
Secondly, the tribunal rightly rejected the respondent’s contention that mere reference 
to the ICSID Rules does not amount to a submission of the ICSID Centre, as reference to the 
rules of an institution in an arbitration agreement or in the instant case, national law, likely 
signifies an intention to conduct institutional arbitration by the rules of that institution.137This 
is because Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not distinguish between arbitration and 
conciliation. 
 In addition to this, by Rule 1 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Institution of 
Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings, a claimant, at the point of submitting the claim, is at 
 
134 See para 75 of the decision of jurisdiction on preliminary objections on 29 October 2014. 
135 It is important to draw a distinction may be drawn between treaties that allow an individual investor or corporate 
entity to seek redress and those which only provide for inter-state dispute settlement such as those of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
136 Schruer et al op cit note 119 at 190. 
137 Nigel Blackaby et al advise against the approach of adapting institutional rules for use in an ad hoc arbitration 
or the use of the rules of an institution in an arbitration before a different institution. See Blackaby et al op cit note 
7 para 1.144, note 154. It is, however, noteworthy that such clauses have been upheld in the Singaporean cases of 
Insigma Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd (2008) SGHC 134 (SC) and HKL Group Co Ltd v Rizq 
International Holdings Pte Ltd (2013) SGHC 5 (HC). 
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liberty to choose between conciliation or arbitration. In essence, once there is a valid 
submission to the ICSID Centre, the argument that the statute which contains the consent does 
not specify the mode of dispute resolution is of no moment.138 
It is clear from the above that section 26(3) does not contain Nigeria’s express consent 
to ICSID but rather consent which is conditional upon a disagreement between parties as to the 
mode of dispute resolution for the resolution of an investment dispute. This conditional consent 
may give rise to controversy and may be unavailable to a number of foreigners who hold 
substantial investments in the country. 
III. ICSID (ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS) ACT 49 OF 1967 
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention provides that contracting states shall recognise an ICSID 
award as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state. The ICSID (Enforcement of 
Awards) Act 49 of 1967 (the ICSID Act) was accordingly enacted to give effect to Nigeria’s 
obligations under Article 54. 
In giving effect to Article 54 of the Convention, section 1(1) of the ICSID Enforcement 
of Awards Act provides that an ICSID award shall be enforced as a final judgment of the 
Supreme Court. Thus, where a party seeking to enforce an award made by ICSID has filed a 
copy of such an award certified by the Secretary General of ICSID at the Supreme Court, the 
award shall be enforced like an award contained in a final judgment of the Supreme Court.  
In essence, a party seeking to enforce an ICSID award in Nigeria is only required to file 
the award at the Registry of the Supreme Court. Upon the filing of the award, the award 
becomes binding like a judgment of the Supreme Court. It is important to note that no formal 
application is required, hence the court does not need to make any order or pronouncement for 
the award to become enforceable. Perhaps more importantly, no appeal can lie against an order 
enforcing such an award. 
  Section 1(2) of the ICSID Act provides that the Chief Justice of Nigeria may make 
rules of court or may adapt any rule of court necessary to give effect to this section. As at the 
time of this writing, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is yet to make any rules pursuant to section 
1(2). Article 55 of the ICSID Convention provides that Article 54 is not to be interpreted as 
derogating from the laws of a contracting state granting immunity to that state or any foreign 
 
138 Schreuer et al op cit note 119 at 89. 
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state from execution. There is no law which grants immunity to Nigeria nor any foreign state 
from the execution of an ICSID award in Nigeria. 
The ICSID (Enforcement of Awards) Act is an impressive statute because it affords a 
successful ICSID claimant speedy enforcement of his award by removing the possibility of 
prolonged enforcement proceedings. Also, it was enacted at a time when there was only one 
layer of appeal in the superior courts’ hierarchy of Nigeria.139 A possible practical inhibition in 
enforcing an ICSID award under the ICSID Act is where a claimant seeks to enforce such an 
award through garnishee proceedings. In such an instance, a party would require the consent 
of the Attorney General of the Federation. This is because by section 84 of the Sheriffs and 
Civil Process Act 40 of 1945, funds in the custody of a public officer can only be attached by 
garnishee proceedings with the consent of the Attorney General. This issue will be discussed 
in more detail later in this dissertation.140 
IV.  THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 11 OF 1988 AND THE 
AMENDMENT BILL 
(a) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 11 of 1988 
The Arbitration Act was enacted as the primary federal statute for the regulation of commercial 
arbitration in Nigeria. The Arbitration Act is largely modelled after the UNCITRAL Model 
Law of 1985 and applies to both domestic and international arbitration.141 The Arbitration Act 
also applies to both domestic and international investment disputes142 and is an important 
component in Nigeria’s ISDS framework as several of Nigeria’s BITs contain the 
government’s consent to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.143  
Section 54 of the Arbitration Act incorporates the New York Convention,144 hence non-
ICSID awards including ICSID Additional Facility Awards are enforced under the New York 
Convention. The Arbitration Act restricts the applicability of the New York Convention to 
awards relating to international commercial arbitration and those from contracting states which 
 
139 At the time of the enactment of the ICSID Enforcement of Awards Act, the Court of Appeal was yet to be 
established and appeals from the High Court went directly to the Supreme Court. 
140 See section V of Chapter 4 below. 
141 See section 58 of the Arbitration Act. 
142 See section 26(2)(a) of the NIPC Act. Non-ICSID awards are enforced under the Arbitration Act and New 
York Convention in Nigeria. 
143 See the for instance, Article 9(2)(d) of the Finland-Nigeria BIT and Article 12(2)(b) of the Spain-Nigeria BIT 
144 The New York Convention is attached as Schedule 2 to the Arbitration Act. 
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have reciprocal legislation recognising the enforcement of arbitral awards made in Nigeria in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 
While the wording of the Arbitration Act seems to afford an unsuccessful party two 
options to challenge an award, i.e. the filing of an application to challenge such an arbitral 
award or resisting the recognition and enforcement of same upon being served with an 
application for enforcement, the courts have held that once an award is not challenged, an 
application for enforcement cannot be resisted.145 This view appears rather odd having regard 
to the clear wording of the Arbitration Act. 
Section 52 of the Arbitration Act provides for the circumstances146 in which the 
Nigerian court may refuse the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.  
(b) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Amendment Bill) 2017 
Several important amendments are being proposed to Nigeria’s arbitration regime by the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Amendment) Bill (the Amendment Bill). Through the 
Amendment Bill,147 the National Assembly seeks to reform the following aspects of arbitration 
practice in Nigeria: 
(i)  Limitation period 
Section 8(1)(d) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State148 sets a time limit of six years for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards where the contract which gave rise to the arbitration was not 
under seal. In interpreting this provision, the Nigerian courts have held that the limitation 
period begins to run from the date that the original cause of action accrued rather than the date 
the award was issued.149 The result of this position is that a claimant may be denied the right 
to enforce an arbitration award by a statute of limitation where arbitration proceedings were 
not commenced on time, either for reasons of negotiations or any other cause or where the 
arbitral proceeding itself has dragged on for a long time. 
 
145 See United Nigeria Insurance Co v Adene (1971) NSCC 159 (SC); Hon Emmanuel Oseloka Araka v Ambrose 
Nwakwo Ejeagwu 1999 (2) NWLR (part 589) 107 (CA). 
146 Similar to those contained in Article V of the New York Convention. 
147 The Amendment Bill, which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, was passed by the Senate on 1 
February 2018 but is yet to be signed by the president. 
148 This provision is in pari materia with the relevant provisions of the Limitation Law of the many of the states 
in Nigeria. 
149 See City Engineering Ltd v Federal Housing Authority 1997 (9) NWLR (part 520) 224; Murmansk State 
Steamship Line vs. Kano Oil Millers Limited 1974 (5) SC 115. 
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The Amendment Bill addresses this issue by providing that the limitation period will 
begin to run from the date of the final award rather than from when the original cause of action 
which gave rise to the arbitration arose.150 The position of the Amendment Bill is similar to the 
provisions of section 35(2) of the Arbitration Law of Lagos State, which provides that the 
limitation period for the enforcement of arbitral awards shall begin to run from the date the 
award is issued thereby addressing the problem with the position laid down by cases like City 
Engineering Ltd v Federal Housing Authority.151  
(ii) Award Review Tribunal 
The Amendment Bill seeks to introduce an appellate mechanism to the arbitration process 
through an award review tribunal. However, this measure is proposed as an opt-in provision 
and will only be available to parties who have agreed to it. The award review tribunal is 
essentially a second-tier tribunal that may review the award on same grounds upon which a 
court may set aside an arbitral award.152 
The Bill provides that the parties may agree on the procedure to be adopted by the award 
review tribunal. In the absence of such an agreement, the tribunal will conduct the proceedings 
in a manner it deems appropriate and deliver its decision within 60 days from the date of the 
constitution of the tribunal.  
The decision of the award review tribunal may be challenged in court.153 Where, 
however, an award has been affirmed by the award review tribunal wholly or in part, a party 
may only apply to the court for the setting aside of the award on the grounds of public policy 
or arbitrability.154 
(iii) Award of interim measures 
The Arbitration Act already empowers a tribunal to award interim measures.155 The 
Amendment Bill confers additional powers on the arbitral tribunal to modify, suspend, or 
terminate an interim measure or a preliminary order that it has granted upon application of any 
 
150 Section 34 of the Amendment Bill. 
151 Supra.  
152 Section 55(7) of the Amendment Bill. 
153 Ibid, section 55(8). 
154 Ibid, section 55(14). 
155 See Article 26 of the Arbitration Rules. 
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party or, in exceptional circumstance and upon notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal’s 
own motion in certain circumstances.156    
The circumstances in which the powers to modify, suspend, or terminate an interim 
measure may be exercised include where important facts were concealed from the arbitral 
tribunal, the measure or order was obtained by fraud, or facts come to the knowledge of the 
arbitral tribunal, which if known at the material time, would have led to the tribunal refusing 
to grant the measure or order.157 
(iv) Emergency arbitrator provisions 
The Amendment Bill introduces provisions relating to the appointment of an emergency 
arbitrator who is empowered to grant urgent interim relief.158 A party in need of such an urgent 
interim relief may apply for same before the arbitral institution designated by the parties or in 
the absence of such a designation, to the court. This should be done at the time of filing a 
request for arbitration, or after filing the request for arbitration but prior to the constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal.  
If the relevant arbitral institution or court considers the application for the appointment 
of an emergency arbitrator meritorious, it is expected, unless the parties otherwise agree, to 
appoint an emergency arbitrator within two business days after the date the application is 
received.159 Any decision of the emergency arbitrator is to take the form of an order and must 
be made within 14 days from the date on which the file is received by the emergency arbitrator. 
The Bill also allows parties to conduct emergency proceedings through a meeting in person, 
by video conference, telephone, or similar means of communication.160 
(v) Third party funding 
Funding of litigation, known as champerty, and maintenance are prohibited under common law 
in Nigeria.161 In essence, it is unlawful for a party to obtain funding from a third party who has 
no legitimate interest in the litigation and an agreement to provide such finance is 
unenforceable. The Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioner 2007 also prohibit 
 
156 Section 19 of the Amendment Bill. 
157 Ibid section 24. 
158 Ibid section 16(1). 
159 Ibid section 16(5). 
160 Ibid section 18(2). 
161 Oloko v Ube 2001 (13) NWLR (Part 729) 161(CA); Kesington Egbor v Ogbebor 2015 LPELR 24902(CA). 
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legal practitioners from financing or acquiring any form of interest in the matters they 
handle.162 
It is a matter of debate whether the prohibition applies to arbitration as well.163 English 
common law, which has a strong persuasive influence in Nigeria, has extended the prohibition 
to arbitration164 and it is likely that a Nigerian court will be inclined to adopt the same view. 
The Amendment Bill puts possible doubts to rest and seeks to permit the practice. 
The Amendment Bill eliminates the common law restrictions on champerty and 
maintenance in Nigerian-seated arbitrations.165 Therefore, when the Bill is eventually passed 
into law, the torts of maintenance and champerty will no longer apply to third party funding of 
arbitration in Nigeria. However, in its current form, the Amendment Bill does not make 
adequate provisions for third party funding. Issues such as withdrawal of funding, 
confidentiality, privilege, disclosure, and conflicts of interest are not addressed in the 
Amendment Bill. The implementation of the Bill may therefore prove problematic in its current 
state. 
In conclusion, the Arbitration Act is a robust piece of legislation that provides an 
adequate legal framework for the investment arbitration to be conducted under the UNCITRAL 
framework. The reforms to be introduced by the Amendment to the Arbitration Act will further 
enhance the ad hoc arbitration regime and ensure that same is updated with innovations which 
are already in place in other jurisdictions. 
 
V. OTHER LEGISLATION 
There are several other pieces of legislation relevant to investor-state arbitration in Nigeria, 
particularly the Petroleum Act 51 of 1969,166 the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and 
Commercialisation) Act 28 of 1999, and the NLG Act (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and 
 
162 See Rule 50(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007. 
163 Sixtus Iwuoha ‘Third party funding in Nigeria seated arbitrations: Time to join the progressives’ 2020 11(1) 
The Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law 11 at 12; Opemipo Omoyeni ‘Third party funding in Nigerian 
seated arbitration: setting the law straight’  accessed at 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/12/third-party-funding-in-nigerian-seated-arbitrations-
setting-the-law-straight/?doing_wp_cron=1598724626.8309440612792968750000 on 29 August 2020.  
164 Bevan Ashford v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) (in liquidation) 1999 Ch 239; See also Willem H Van Boom 
‘Third Party Funding in International Investment Arbitration’ (2011) SSRN 37 accessed at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2027114 accessed on 30 August 2020. 
165 Section 50(1)(g),83 of the Amendment Bill and Article 41(1)(g) of the Arbitration Rules to the Amendment 
Bill. 
166 See also Regulation 41 to the Petroleum Act. 
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Assurances) Act 39 of 1990(the NLG Act). Section 11 of the Petroleum Act provides that 
disputes in the petroleum sector shall be resolved by arbitration while section 22 of the second 
schedule to the NLG Act contains the Nigerian government’s consent to ICSID arbitration in 
respect of disputes in the liquified natural gas sub-sector.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It can be seen from the above that Nigeria’s statutory framework for investment arbitration 
affords access to arbitration under the ICSID system and other arbitration Rules. The NIPC Act 
which contains Nigeria’s consent to the ICSID mechanism does not provide express consent 
but rather qualified or conditional consent. This consent is conditional upon a disagreement as 
to the mode of dispute settlement. Where there is an agreement or treaty which provides for 
another mode of dispute resolution, the conditional consent at section 26(3) of the NIPC Act 
may be unavailable to an investor. 
The ICSID Act is a crucial component in Nigeria’s ISDS legal framework because it 
provides that ICSID awards shall be enforced directly at the Supreme Court. This gives the 
ICSID mechanism an important advantage in the Nigerian context because direct enforcement 
at the Supreme Court under the ICSID Act eliminates the possibility of prolonged enforcement 
proceedings and appeals in respect of enforcement and setting aside proceedings. 
The Arbitration Act is Nigeria’s primary framework for ad hoc arbitration. The 
Arbitration Act incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules, which are enacted in Nigeria as the 
Arbitration Rules, and the New York Convention.167 The Amendment Bill seeks to introduce 
a number of innovations to make the ad hoc mechanism and possibly non-ICSID institutional 
arbitration especially with respect to matters such as court-ordered measures and post-arbitral 
award litigation more effective. 
Other legislation, like the Petroleum Act, which provide for the resolution of disputes 
in the oil and gas industry by arbitration contains an important statutory framework for investor 
state arbitration. In accordance with this provision of the Petroleum Act, the production sharing 
contracts in the oil and gas industry typically contain arbitration clauses for contractual disputes 
arising from the PSCs. The LNG Act which seeks to attract investment into the liquified natural 
gas sectors provides for ICSID arbitration as the mode of resolving disputes. 
 
167 Schedules 1 and 2 to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
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In addition to the statutes discussed above, Nigeria’s treaty framework forms an 
important component of the country’s ISDS framework. Conventions such the ICSID 


























 THE TREATY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN 
NIGERIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the treaty framework for investor-state arbitration in Nigeria. In addition 
to the statutes discussed in Chapter 2 above, Nigeria is a party to a number of important 
conventions and treaties which provide a robust legal framework for investor state arbitration. 
Only treaties which have been enacted into law in Nigeria and which contain investor-state 
dispute resolution clauses168 will be examined for the reason that only such treaties can be 
considered to be part of the legal framework for investor-state arbitration in Nigeria. 
 Having shown that there are gaps in the statutory framework for ISDS in Nigeria, 
especially the lack of express consent to ICSID arbitration in the NIPC Act in respect of 
disputes with foreign investors, this chapter explores the treaty framework for ISDS and the 
adequacy thereof. This chapter therefore analyses the following conventions and treaties: (i) 
the ICSID Convention, (ii) the New York Convention, (iii) the Revised ECOWAS treaty (iv) 
the ECOWAS Supplementary Agreement (v) the OIC Agreement, and finally Nigeria’s 
Bilateral Investment Treaties.  
II. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
a. The ICSID Convention 
The ICSID Convention which came into effect on 14 October 1966 is one of Nigeria’s most 
important treaties for the conduct of investor-state arbitration. The ICSID Convention applies 
to investment disputes which the parties ie a member host state and a national(s) of another 
member state have agreed to submit to the centre. An ICSID tribunal will only assume 
jurisdiction over an investment dispute rather than a commercial claim.169  
Nigeria signified its commitment to the protection of foreign investments and the ISDS 
mechanism by its early ratification of the Convention on 13 July 1965 and domesticating same 
on 23 August 1965. The ICSID Convention has been wholly adopted by Nigeria. No territories 
 
168 Important treaties like the World Trade Organization and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement 
(AfCFTA) are not discussed because their dispute resolution clauses only provide for settlement of disputes 
between states. It is also noteworthy that the ECOWAS Energy Treaty is yet to be enacted into law in Nigeria. 
169 See for example Postova v banka a.s. and INSTROKAPITAL SE v Greece ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8 award 
dispatched on 9 April 2015, para 333-50, where it was held that the claimant’s interests in government bonds did 
not qualify as an ‘investment’ neither within the meaning of the treaty nor Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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within Nigeria have been excluded and no notifications have been given by Nigeria on any 
class of disputes to be excluded pursuant to sections 70 and Article 25(4) of the Convention 
respectively.170 The consent of the Nigerian government as contained in a number of treaties 
may be treated as a standing offer to arbitrate which an aggrieved investor may accept by filing 
a claim.171 
In addition to the designation of the state-owned oil company, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation as a constituent agency,172 the Nigerian government enacted the ICSID 
Act discussed in chapter 2 above. ICSID awards are to be enforced by member states as final 
judgments of their courts. One of the primary advantages of the ICSID mechanism lies in the 
obligation of member states to enforce such judgments as final judgments of their courts. 
Another key advantage of the ICSID mechanism is that it is a self-contained mechanism 
which ensures that the ICSID arbitral proceedings are not subject to any national seat; thereby 
removing the possibility of setting aside proceedings at under national arbitration laws at such 
seats. The effect of this is that ICSID awards are not subject to the varying provisions of the 
national arbitration laws. This removes the possibility of an ICSID award being denied 
enforceability on wider grounds such as arbitrability and public policy. Moreover, by Article 
52 of the ICSID Convention, an ICSID award can only be annulled by an ad hoc Annulment 
Committee constituted by ICSID, on limited grounds similar to those contained in the New 
York Convention.  
For the above reasons, the ICSID Convention is arguably a more effective mode of 
investment dispute resolution than UNCITRAL arbitration in the Nigerian context. This is 
because the process potentially affords the speedy enforcement of awards and eliminates the 
possibility of prolonged post arbitral award litigation, especially in the Nigerian context, unlike 
enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention and the Arbitration Act.173  
 
170See https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-states/database-of-member-states/member-state-
details?state=ST102 last accessed on 3 October 2020.     
171 Paulsson op cit note 99 at 236. 
172 NNPC was designated as a constituent agency on 11 May 1978 pursuant to Article 25(1) and (3) of the ICSID 
Convention. Because the NNPC is an important player in the nation’s important oil and gas industry and the 
counter-party(on behalf of the government) to many contracts in the oil and gas industry on behalf of the Nigerian 
government, the designation of the NNPC as a constituent agency is a pragmatic way of giving effect to the 
Convention on the part of the Nigerian government. 
173 Andrew Okekeifere ‘Enforcement and challenge of foreign arbitral awards in Nigeria (1997) 14(3) J. Int'l Arb. 
223 at 226. 
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However, Nigeria’s express consent to the ICSID framework is contained in less than 
15 BITs, practically none of the MITs in force, and conditionally in the NIPC Act. Only the 
NLG Act contains express consent to the ICSID Centre. Also, in the absence of a BIT which 
contains Nigeria’s express consent to the ICSID Centre, it is uncertain that an investor will be 
able to take advantage of the conditional consent in the NIPC Act in all instances.  
Overall, the ICSID Convention affords an effective mechanism for ISDS especially 
regarding the enforcement of a valid award. However, the limited number of the treaties which 
contain Nigeria’s consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre and the qualified consent in 
the NIPC Act significantly curtails the availability of the mechanism to a wider range of 
nationalities who may have significant investments in Nigeria. 
b. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
1958 (the New York Convention) 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (‘the 
New York Convention’) which was acceded to by Nigeria on 17 March 1970 and came to force 
in Nigeria on 15 June 1970 provides for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. Section 54(1) of the Arbitration Act incorporates the New York Convention into 
Nigerian law174 and provides for the enforcement of final arbitral awards arising out of 
international commercial arbitration. The New York Convention is vital for the enforcement 
of awards rendered under ICSID additional facility and other non-ICSID investor-state 
arbitration proceedings. 
Section 54 of the Arbitration Act reserves the applicability of the Convention to states 
which are members of the Convention and which have reciprocal legislation recognising the 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in Nigeria in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention.175 The Arbitration Act also restricts the applicability of the Convention to 
contractual disputes.176 Because the provision of section 54 exists without prejudice to the 
provision of section 51, it would appear that section 51 exists independently of section 54 and 
that the foreign arbitral awards can be enforced in Nigeria in instances where the New York 
Convention will not apply by the reservations contained at section 54 by section 51. 
 
174 The New York Convention is attached as the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act. 
175 Section 54(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act. 
176 Section 54(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 
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The widespread adoption of the New York Convention177 affords a successful claimant 
a range of options for the jurisdiction where a final award may be enforced provided the losing 
party has assets in such a jurisdiction. However, in Nigeria, unlike the measure of finality 
afforded by the ICSID Act by the enforceability of ICSID awards at the Supreme Court, 
enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention have to be filed at the High Court 
and are therefore subject to the possibility of delays and prolonged appellate proceedings.178 
The adoption of the Convention also gives arbitration an important advantage over 
litigation in Nigeria especially in the area of enforcing the final outcome of the process179 for 
two reasons. First, there is still a degree of uncertainty concerning the legal regime for the 
enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria. This is because the legal framework consists of a 
mixture of archaic ordinances and common law requirements.180 Secondly, a foreign judgment 
in Nigeria may have to be enforced by means of a new action hence there is a possibility of 
challenges on matters of substance to such an action coupled with possible difficulties in 
ascertaining the principles of foreign law according to which the dispute was determined in the 
foreign forum.181 In general, the New York Convention serves as a vital anchor for the non-
ICSID arbitration process in Nigeria.182 
c. The Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993) 
The Revised Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty (‘the Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty’) was signed on 24 July 1993 to reaffirm the ECOWAS Treaty of 28 May 
1975.183 The aim of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty includes the promotion of co-operation and 
integration, with a view to the establishing an economic union in West Africa to raise the living 
standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, promote relations-
among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African 
Continent.184 
 
177 165 countries as of August 2020 including most if not all the major economies. 
178 Fagboyegun op cit note 99 at 52-3. 
179 Olawoyin op cit note 26 at 131-132; See also Gbenga Bamodu ‘The enforcement of foreign money judgments 
in Nigeria: A case of unnecessary judicial pragmatism?’ (2012) 12(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 1. 
180 Olawoyin ibid at 132,134-38. 
181 Ibid at 132. 
182 Ufot op cit 28 at 824, 836. 
183 See Article 2 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty. See https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/treaties/treaties-with-investment-provisions/3778/ecowas-treaty accessed on 20 January 
2020. 
184 Ibid at Article 3(1) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. 
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The treaty applies to investments among member states of the ECOWAS region. It 
seeks to facilitate cross-border investment by the promotion of joint venture initiatives by 
private sector enterprises and other investors and envisages the adoption of a regional 
agreement on cross border investment.185 
 The treaty contains important investment protection guarantees relating to most 
favoured nation treatment and non-arbitrary or discriminatory measures.186 Although the 
guarantees at provisions of Articles 43 to 44 relate to trade, nothing in the treaty excludes their 
application to investment activities, hence those provisions may be regarded as important 
investment guarantees.  
Article 16 of the treaty establishes an arbitration tribunal. However, the article does not 
contain any provision about the kind of disputes that may submitted to arbitration or the scope 
of application of the article. There is also no indication whether the reference to arbitration at 
the aforementioned article is in respect of state-state or investor-state disputes.  
Although Article 16(2) provides that ‘the status, composition, powers, procedure and 
other issues concerning the Arbitration Tribunal shall be as set out in a Protocol relating 
thereto’, no protocol has been issued regarding the procedure and other modalities for the 
conduct of arbitration pursuant to the said article have not been established. In the absence of 
the protocol described above, it is doubtful if the ECOWAS Court can act as an arbitral tribunal. 
This is because the power and jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court as an arbitral tribunal are 
uncertain and cannot be invoked.  
 The vague dispute resolution provisions of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty alone cannot 
serve as a basis for investor-state arbitration as the treaty contains no provisions on the 
resolution of investment disputes. Furthermore, as explained above, the protocol for the 
conduct of arbitration is yet to be issued. The ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments 
enacted pursuant to the ECOWAS Revised Treaty contains more detailed provisions on 




185 Ibid at Article 3(2)(e) and (f) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. 




d. ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments (2008) 
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments (‘the Supplementary Act’) was enacted as 
a form of delegated legislation by ECOWAS pursuant to the revised ECOWAS Treaty to create 
a legal framework for the promotion of investment that supports ‘sustainable development’ in 
the West African sub-region.187  
The Supplementary Act applies to all investments by an investor, whether the 
investment is made before or after the entry into force of the Act.188 Also, the Act contains 
important investment protection guarantees such as national treatment,189 most favoured nation 
treatment,190 prohibition of unlawful expropriation without compensation,191 and free 
transferability of assets and profits relating to investment.192  
In addition to investment guarantees, the Supplementary Act contains two key 
provisions which address some of the criticisms of the ISDS framework. The first relates to the 
imposition of an obligation on the investor to conduct pre-environmental impact assessment 
tests prior to the admission of investment193 while the second relates to the transparency in the 
conduct of procedural and substantive dispute settlement hearings.194 
 However, the dispute resolution provisions of the Supplementary Act are unclear. 
Article 33 of the Supplementary Act deals with dispute resolution and provides for the 
resolution of state-state and investor-state disputes through arbitration but the arbitration 
referenced is not binding.195 Under Article 35(2), a dispute which has been resolved by 
arbitration may be submitted to another ‘competent jurisdiction’ hence the arbitration referred 
to at Article 33(6) is not a conclusive mode of dispute resolution. 
Moreover, the Supplementary Act does not refer to any of the recognised mechanisms 
or rules of arbitration such as ICSID or the UNCITRAL Rules. Rather, the Supplementary Act 
contemplates arbitration through the ECOWAS Court of Justice (the ECOWAS Court. Article 
 
187 See Article 3 of the Supplementary Act. 
188 Ibid Article 4. 
189 Ibid Article 5. 
190 Ibid Article 6. 
191 Ibid Article 8. 
192 Ibid Article 10. 
193 Ibid Article 12(1). 
194 Ibid Article 34. 
195 Ibid Article 35(2). 
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9(6) of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (‘the Protocol’) requires the consent of 
the parties for disputes to be submitted to the ECOWAS Court.196 There is also a ‘cooling off’ 
period of six months within which the parties are required to explore the possibility of amicable 
settlement.  
It appears that the word ‘arbitration’ is used rather loosely at Article 33(1) of the 
Supplementary Act. This is in the light of the reference to ‘court’ at Article 33(6) which 
provides as follows: 
Any dispute between a host Member State and an Investor, as envisaged under this Article that 
is not amicably settled through mutual discussions may be submitted to arbitration as follows:  
(a) a national court.  
(b) any national machinery for the settlement of investment disputes. 
(c) the relevant national court of the Member States. 
 
Article 33 of the Supplementary Act makes no reference to the arbitral tribunal to be 
established under Article 16 of the Revised Ecowas Treaty. Moreover, although Article 16 of 
the ECOWAS Revised Treaty establishes an arbitration tribunal for the community, the 
protocol which is required by the Supplementary Act to make provisions for the status, 
composition, powers, and other issues relating to the arbitral tribunal is yet to be enacted. 
Article 9(5) of the Revised Protocol of the ECOWAS Court of Justice(ECJ) provides 
that pending the establishment of the Arbitration Tribunal provided under Article 16 of the 
ECOWAS Treaty, the ECJ shall have the power to act as arbitrator for the purpose of Article 
16 of the treaty. In the interim, the ECOWAS Treaty empowers the ECOWAS court to 
adjudicate investment disputes pending the establishment of the arbitral tribunal contemplated 
by Article 16 of the Treaty.  
It is questionable whether the ECJ can perform this function as an arbitral body because 
there is no specific provision in the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice that provides 
for the court to have jurisdiction over investor–state disputes and the protocol relating to the 
arbitral tribunal as explained in the preceding paragraph is yet to be enacted.197 The effect of 
this is that power and jurisdiction of the ECJ as a potential arbitral tribunal is yet to be 
defined.198  
 
196 Matthew Happold and Relja Radovic ‘The ECOWAS Court of Justice as an investment tribunal’ (2017) SSRN 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3003616 accessed on 3 September 2020. 
197 Matthew Happold ‘Investor-state dispute settlement using the ECOWAS Court of Justice: An analysis and 




 Notably, Article 35 deals with the enforceability and finality of the outcome of dispute 
settlement proceedings. Article 35(1) provides that ‘the Final Awards/Decisions on investment 
disputes made by mediations, arbitrations and judicial bodies shall be enforceable.’ While 
Article 35(2) imposes an obligation on member states parties to the Supplementary Act to abide 
by the decisions of mediation, arbitration, and judicial bodies on investment disputes, there is 
no procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards and settlement agreements made pursuant 
to mediation.  
Arbitral awards may therefore be enforced under the New York Convention and 
mediated settlement agreements may be enforced under the United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Mediation 
Convention) which entered into force on 12 September 2020 where the Convention has been 
ratified by the state where the Agreement is to be enforced.199  
 While the Supplementary Act contains impressive provisions relating to the admission 
and protection of investment, the dispute resolution provisions of the Supplementary Act are 
inadequate and confusing.200 However, there may be a leeway for investors to file claims for 
breach of investment protection guarantees or violation of property rights against their host 
state at the ECJ by invoking the human rights jurisdiction of the ECJ.201 The ECJ may also 
assume jurisdiction over a dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to it hence the ECJ 
may assume jurisdiction over an investment dispute if the parties consent to the jurisdiction of 
the court.202 
 
e. Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee on Investments Among 
Members of the Islamic Conference (1981) 
The Agreement on the Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member 
States of the Organization of Islamic Conference (the OIC Agreement) was framed following 
 
199 Interestingly, Nigeria is the only West African country that has signed the Singapore Convention as at the time 
of writing. Nigeria is yet to ratify same. 
200 Happold op cit note 197 at 510-11. 
201 This is pursuant to Article 9(4) of the Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice 
(which entered into force on 5 November 1996) and amended by the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05. See 
for example Dexter Oil Ltd v Liberia ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/19 of 6 February 2019 where the court allowed the 
claimant to bring a claim for the freezing of its bank account by the Liberian authorities. Although the claim 
ultimately failed on the merits, the court acknowledged that corporations enjoy a limited number of rights under 
international law such as the right to fair hearing, freedom of expression and property. Accordingly, an artificial 
person is entitled to bring such a claim  
202 Article 9(6) of the Protocol. 
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the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad, Iraq held from 1 to 5 
June 1981 and entered into force in February 1988. This agreement was drawn up by member 
states of the Organization of Islamic Conference to implement the Agreement for Economic, 
Technical and Commercial Cooperation among member states of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, especially the provisions of the Article 1 of the said Agreement and to 
create a favourable climate for investment in member states. 
The OIC Agreement applies to investments among member states of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference which consists of about 53 states across Africa, Asia, and the Balkans 
with substantial Muslim populations.203 The Agreement defines an ‘investment’ as follows:  
‘…employment of capital in one of the permissible fields in the territories of a contracting party 
with a view to achieving a profitable return , or the transfer of capital to a contracting party for 
the same purpose, in accordance with this Agreement.’ 
 
An ‘investor’ is defined as follows: 
‘…the government of any contracting party or natural corporate person, who is a natural of a 
contracting party and who owns the capital and invests it in the territory of another contracting 
party’.204 
Articles 10 to 14 of the agreement contains important investment guarantees typically found in 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties notably national treatment, the guarantee against 
expropriation without compensation, free transferability of funds relating to investment, and 
compensation for any violation of rights or guarantees. 
Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement provides for dispute resolution and afford an 
investor a choice between litigation,205 arbitration,206 and conciliation.207 Article 16 of the 
Agreement provides for resolution of disputes by litigation and states that the host state 
guarantees the investor the right to access to court for redress in respect of any measures that 
an investor may be dissatisfied with or for shortcomings’ with the provisions of the laws or 
 
203 Members of the Organization of Islamic State are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tadjikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Tanzania. Article 59 of the Articles of Agreement of the Islamic Conference 
for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit also provides for the resolution of disputes by arbitration. 
204Chapter 3 of the OIC Agreement.  
Article 1(5) and (6) of the OIC Agreement.  
205 Article 16(1) of the OIC Agreement. 
206 Ibid at Article 17(1). 
207 Ibid at Article 17(2). 
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regulations in force in the host territory. irrespective of whether the complaint is related, or 
otherwise, to the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement’.  
In essence, an investor may seek redress for breach of a treaty standard before a national 
court. Article 16 contains a fork in the road clause which compels an investor to choose 
between arbitration and litigation. The wording of Article 16 suggests that an investor may 
litigate disputes relating to the breach of investment guarantees if such an investor so wishes. 
The Agreement envisages the eventual creation of a mechanism for the resolution of 
investment disputes although no timeframe for such is specified. However, until such a system 
is put in place, disputes that may arise out of the operation of the agreement shall be resolved 
through conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedure set out in the said 
article.208  
Article 17(2) which deals with arbitration, provides for procedure for the 
commencement of the arbitration and the appointment of the arbitrators. More importantly, the 
decisions of an arbitral tribunal in such arbitral proceedings shall be final and unchallengeable. 
Similar to the ICSID Convention, Article 17(2)(d) imposes an obligation on member states to 
enforce such an award as a binding and final regardless of whether the enforcing state was a 
party to the dispute or not and whether the investor is one of its nationals or residents.  
The OIC Agreement imposes an obligation on an OIC state to enforce an OIC award 
within its territory, whether or not such a contracting state was a party to the dispute, and 
irrespective of whether the investor against whom the decision was passed is one of its nationals 
or residents or not, as if it were a final and enforceable decision of its national courts. OIC 
awards have the force of judicial decisions.209 
This feature of the OIC Agreement is strikingly similar to the ICSID Enforcement 
regime in that it provides that its awards are to be enforced like final judgments of courts. 
Further, unlike the ICSID mechanism which affords the possibility of annulment on a number 
of grounds,210 Article 17(2)(d) of the OIC Agreement provides that the decision of the arbitral 
tribunal shall be final and cannot be contested.  
 
208 See Article 17(1). Article 17(2) contains procedural steps to be taken in conducting arbitration particularly the 
commencement of arbitration and the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the hearing of the dispute. 
209 Article 17(2)(d) of the OIC Agreement. 
210 See Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
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It is however desirable to include an annulment system on grounds similar to that of the 
ICSID Convention in the OIC mechanism. This is because even if the OIC system ensures the 
appointment of the best arbitrators, there is still a possibility of error. For instance, an arbitrator 
may exceed his powers or scope of reference or inadvertently commit a procedural error that 
may amount to a breach of fair hearing. It is therefore preferrable to include a measure to guard 
against injustice in instances where an arbitrator may have acted wrongly.  
Finally, although the exact number of arbitral proceedings that have been commenced 
on the basis of the OIC Agreement is unknown, it is interesting to note that in recent times, 
there has reportedly been an increase in the use of the OIC Agreement as an investment 
protection instrument.211 OIC arbitration may therefore afford a viable dispute resolution 
option to nationals of OIC states that do not have BITs with Nigeria in view of the substantive 
protections afforded therein.  
f. Other multilateral investment treaties 
Other important multilateral investment treaties include the Partnership Agreement between 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Union 2000 
(the Cotonou Agreement) and the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 1985 (MIGA).212  
The Cotonou Agreement was signed as a partnership agreement between the European 
Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) to facilitate economic, 
cultural and social development of the states to improve peace, security, and create a stable and 
democratic political environment on 23 June 2000.  
The agreement also contains investment protection measures and provides for the 
resolution of disputes by arbitration.213 However, it is unclear what procedure is to be adopted 
for the conduct of arbitration as the agreement only provides that the arbitration shall be ‘in 
accordance with the procedural rules which will be adopted by decision of the Council of 
 
211 Hogan Lovells ‘The organization of Islamic Cooperation Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee 
of Investments among member states: Thirty years since its entry into force’ available at 
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-organisation-of-islamic-cooperation-agreement-on-
promotion-protection-and-guarantee-of-investments-among-member-states accessed on 5 September 2020 
212 The MIGA contemplates the resolution of disputes between member states and the Agency. See Article 57 of 
MIGA and Article 4 of Annex II of MIGA. 
213 Article 30 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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Ministers at the first meeting following the signing of the Agreement and following the 
recommendation of the ACP EC Development Finance Committee’.214 
 It can be seen from the above that unlike regional treaties like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),215 the MITs do not generally provide for ICSID arbitration or 
even UNCITRAL arbitration hence they cannot form the basis of the Nigerian government to 
ICSID arbitration pursuant to section 26(2)(b) and (c) of the NIPC Act, or UNCITRAL Rules 
arbitration. A few of them such as the OIC Agreement and the Cotonou Agreement contain 
peculiar arbitration provisions. 
III. NIGERIA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Nigeria has signed a total of 31 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) starting with the France-
Nigeria BIT on 27 February 1990.216 Of this number, 15 have been ratified. Although the last 
BIT, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT was signed in 2016, the National Assembly has not ratified any 
BIT in the last ten years.  
 A close examination of these BITs reveals a lack of policy coherence in vital aspects 
of investment protection such as admission of investment, definition of investment, national 
and most favoured nation treatments, fair and equitable treatment, exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, and the scope of consent to international adjudication etc.217 Most notably, Nigeria 
has no model BIT218 and the BITs currently in force in Nigeria contain significant textual 
variations in several respects. In this section, however, the author focuses on the dispute 
resolution provisions in those BITs.219 In view of the lack of express consent to the ICSID 
 
214 Ibid. 
215 See Article 1120 of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 
216 See https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/153/nigeria last 
accessed on 29 September 2020. The dispute resolution provisions of Nigeria’s BITs are highlighted in Appendix 
II of this thesis, except for the Taiwan-Nigeria BIT which was unavailable at the time of the conclusion of this 
thesis. 
217 See Appendix II of this dissertation; See also Orji Uka An Appraisal of the Legal and Regulatory Regime for 
the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments in Nigeria (unpublished LLM dissertation, King’s College 
London 2019) 16. 
218 There are indications that this is likely to change soon as Nigeria is likely to reform its BIT practice soon. See 
Kingsley Alu ‘Nigeria begins reforms of International Investment Agreements’ Leadership 9 August 2020 
available at https://leadership.ng/2020/08/09/nigeria-begins-reforms-of-international-investment-agreements/ 
last accessed on 7 September 2020. 
219 https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/153/nigeria accessed on 
17/01/2020. Nigeria has also signed but is yet to ratify BITs with Turkey, Bulgaria, Egypt, Algeria, Jamaica, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, the Russian Federation, Kuwait, Austria, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Canada. 
The China-Nigeria BIT of 1997 has been terminated. 
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arbitration in the NIPC Act, it is worth considering whether Nigeria’s BIT regime provides an 
adequate framework for ISDS.  
The provisions of the dispute resolution clauses of the various BITs are not uniform 
perhaps because as stated above, Nigeria has no model BIT. However, the dispute resolution 
provisions are similar. While some of the BITs immediately provide for ICSID arbitration 
only,220 a number afford the option of either ICSID and UNCITRAL rules,221 with some 
containing provisions which grants the option to either litigate or submit disputes to 
arbitration.222 A striking similarity of most is the requirement to explore amicable settlement 
or ‘consultations’ during cooling off periods.223 
Nigeria has only 15 BITs in force, with only 13 of them providing for the ICSID 
mechanism. Consequently, not all potential investors can initiate investor state arbitration 
against Nigeria at ICSID on the basis of the express consent given in the BITs. Nigeria hosts 
significant investment from countries other than those with which it has BITs, notably the 
United States224 and India.225 Therefore, if BITs witness a further decline in popularity and 
some of the existing BITs are terminated, the number of investors who may take advantage of 
the express consent will be further reduced.  
Moreover, unlike local investors who may commence ad hoc arbitration against the 
Nigerian government on the basis of section 26(2)(a) of the NIPC Act which contains Nigeria’s 
consent to ad hoc arbitration in respect of investment disputes with local investors, a foreign 
investor whose home state does not have a treaty that provides for UNCITRAL arbitration or 
other form of arbitration may be unable to commence arbitration against Nigeria. 
 In the absence of a treaty, an investor may only submit a dispute to arbitration with the 
consent of the Nigerian government to such arbitration, most likely on the basis of an 
 
220 See the BITs with the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. 
221 See the BITs with Finland, Spain, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, and Romania. In the case of South Africa, 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules and ad hoc arbitration (although not under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 
222 See the BITs with Finland, Spain, Serbia, Sweden, China, Switzerland, Italy, and Romania. 
223 A cooling-off period is the time during which parties are required to engage in consultations or negotiations 
towards an amicable resolution of the dispute prior to the filing of a claim. See Blackaby et al op cit note 7 at para 
8.45. The Netherlands and the UK.do not have cooling off periods. 
224 See statistics on US investment in Nigeria available on the website of the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative at https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/nigeria last accessed on 4 October 2020; Maryam 
Abdu ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria’ (2013) 6(1) Conference of the International 
Journal of Arts and Sciences 63 at 67-68 
225 See Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission ‘Indian investments in Nigeria exceed 15 billion dollars, says 
High Commissioner’ available at https://nipc.gov.ng/2020/01/28/indian-investments-in-nigeria-exceed-15-
billion-dollars-says-high-commissioner/ last accessed on 30 September 2020. 
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investment agreement.226 In view of the limited number of BITs and the lack of consent to 
arbitration in most of the investment-related instruments, an amendment to the NIPC Act is 
necessary for express consent to be given by the Nigerian government. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Nigeria is a signatory to several important conventions and treaties which provide a viable 
framework for the resolution of investment disputes in addition to statutes like the NIPC Act, 
ICSID Act, and the Arbitration Act. However, some of the treaties such as ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act on Investments contain inadequate or ambiguous dispute resolution 
provisions. 
The ICSID Convention and the Agreement for the Promotion, Protection and Guarantee 
of Investments among Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference are 
remarkable in that they provide for an enforcement regime aimed at avoiding prolonged 
enforcement proceedings.227 Furthermore, the ICSID and OIC framework offer the advantage 
of enforceability in a manner similar to that of a final judgment of a national court.  
An OIC award cannot be contested while an ICSID award may only be contested on 
limited grounds, including that the tribunal has been improperly constituted, it failed to provide 
reasons for its decision or has acted in manifest excess of its powers, corruption, or a departure 
from a fundamental rule or procedure.228 An ICSID award that has not been annulled must be 
enforced as a final judgment of the court where the enforcement is sought in an ICSID 
Convention state.229  
Although the New York Convention affords an effective enforcement framework for 
arbitration conducted under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules, and 
institutional rules, there are some drawbacks to the enforcement of awards under the New York 
Convention in Nigeria. A dissatisfied party may resist the enforcement of such an award under 
the New York Convention on grounds that are unavailable under the ICSID annulment system, 
i.e. arbitrability and public policy. Furthermore, enforcement and set-aside proceedings have 
 
226 Typically, Public Private Partnership (PPP)Agreements, Built Operate and Transfer (BOT) Contracts, 
Concession Agreements etc. 
227 See sections II(a) and (e) above for the discussion on ICSID Convention and OIC Agreement, respectively. 
228 Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
229 Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
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been known to last for several years in the Nigerian courts.230 The next chapter discusses the 



























 INADEQUACIES IN THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION IN NIGERIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are several factors within Nigeria’s investor-state arbitration framework which inhibit 
the efficiency of this mode of dispute resolution, especially at the enforcement stage. Having 
shown in Chapter 1 that a neutral and efficient dispute resolution framework is an important 
component of a healthy investment climate, the author will discuss the flaws in the legal 
framework for investment arbitration in Nigeria in this chapter. 
 This chapter therefore explores the following issues: (i) the inadequacies of the NIPC 
Act as an investment protection statute, (ii) problems associated with the enforcement of non-
ICSID awards in Nigeria, (iii) the unenforceability of interim relief in aid of ICSID arbitration, 
(iv), the limitation period for the enforcement of arbitral awards, and (v) the requirement of the 
Attorney General’s consent for the attachment of judgment debts in garnishee proceedings.  
II. INADEQUACIES OF THE NIPC ACT AS AN INVESTOR-STATE  
ARBITRATION   STATUTE 
The NIPC Act is not a comprehensive investment statute and contains a number of flaws. 
However only those flaws relating to dispute resolution are examined here because of their 
significance with respect to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in a potential action. These 
are primarily the consent of the Nigerian government to ICSID arbitration in the NIPC Act and 
the definition of ‘investment’.  
a. Lack of express consent to ICSID arbitration in the NIPC Act 
Sections 26(2)(b) and (c) of the NIPC Act restate Nigeria’s commitment to the dispute 
resolution mechanism in the country’s treaty regime and provide that such disputes shall be 
resolved ‘within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment 
protection to which the Federal Government and the country of which the investor is a national 
are parties’ or within the framework of any national or international machinery agreed to by 
the parties. 
 The effect of the absence of express consent to the ICSID Centre in the NIPC Act is 
that an aggrieved foreign investor may either look to a treaty if his home state has one with 
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Nigeria for the latter’s consent to ICSID or take advantage of the conditional consent to the 
ICSID Centre contained in section 26(3) of the NIPC Act. As indicated in section III of Chapter 
3 above, Nigeria has only 15 BITs in force, 13 of which have provisions for the resolution of 
disputes by ICSID arbitration. None of the MITs provides for ICSID arbitration. Nigeria’s 
treaty regime as the framework for ICSID arbitration as contemplated by section 26(2)(b) of 
the NIPC Act may therefore be unhelpful for investors who prefer the ICSID mechanism 
because of its advantage in enforcement, where the home state of such an investor has no treaty 
with Nigeria. 
 Section 26(3) of the NIPC Act provides that where there is a dispute between an 
investor and the government on the mode of dispute resolution to be adopted, the ICSID Rules 
shall apply. Nigeria’s consent to ICSID arbitration at section 26(3) of the NIPC Act, this 
consent is at best qualified or conditional consent which is conditional upon a disagreement 
between the disputing parties as to the mode of dispute resolution.  
Where there is a treaty between the home state of the investor and Nigeria which 
provides for a dispute resolution method other than ICSID arbitration, it is arguable that 
because there is an agreement between the parties on how to resolve disputes and such an 
investor will be unable to take advantage of the ICSID mechanism in terms of section 26(3) of 
the NIPC Act. In such a scenario, it can be said that there is already an agreement on dispute 
resolution and the condition at section 26(3) which stipulates the existence of   a disagreement 
as to the mode of dispute resolution before the conditional consent at the said provision can be 
activated, would not have been fulfilled. 
 Also, there has been a decline in the popularity of investment treaties in recent times. 
BITs had previously gained great momentum from around 1987 with over 1900 BITs 
concluded around this period.231 Globally, the number of BITs signed each year began to 
decrease around 2001232 and although about 330 investment treaties were concluded between 
2010 and 2014,233 there are indications that the treaty regime may be losing popularity in some 
important jurisdictions.234 None of Nigeria’s regional trade and investment treaties, eg the 
ECOWAS treaty and the Cotonou Agreement, provide for ICSID arbitration, hence an investor 
 
231 Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 51. 
232 Ibid at 702; UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking UN Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007). 
233 See UNCTAD, World Investment Reports (UN, 2011-2015) available online at http://unctad.org. 
234 Lim et al op cit 1 at 491. 
55 
 
especially from the West African states will not be able to take advantage of the ICSID 
mechanism on the basis of the regional treaties.  
  It is therefore clear that Nigeria’s treaty regime is inadequate as the basis for investor-
state arbitration owing to the limited number of BITs and the fact that multilateral investment 
treaties at the regional level either contain unclear arbitration provisions235or do not provide 
for arbitration as the mode of dispute resolution. As Nigeria seeks to attract foreign direct 
investment in diversifying its economy,236 investors from more countries than those with which 
Nigeria has BITs should be afforded the assurance that a neutral dispute resolution mechanism 
such as ICSID affords, hence the NIPC Act ought to be amended to include Nigeria’s express 
consent to ICSID arbitration. 
b. Definition of ‘investment’ in the NIPC Act 
As stated in para (II)d of Chapter 2 above, the NIPC Act defines an investment as ‘investment 
made to acquire an interest in an enterprise operating within and outside the economy of 
Nigeria’. This vague definition may be problematic because commercial claims could be 
elevated to the standard of investment claims as a result. In the absence of a treaty which clearly 
defines the concept of investment in the ‘objective’ sense,237 a tribunal may be constrained to 
treat what ordinarily would be a commercial claim as an investment dispute on the basis of the 
definition in the NIPC Act.238 
III. INTERIM RELIEF IN AID OF ICSID ARBITRATION 
Generally, a party may require interim measures to prevent irreparable harm from being done 
to the subject matter of the dispute or to secure the claim.239 In more extreme cases, such an 
interim measure may be required to obtain evidence or to preserve evidence in the custody of 
a state party.240  
Unlike commercial arbitration, which has a seat and whose municipal courts may grant 
interim reliefs and other measures in aid of the arbitral process, the ICSID process is ‘a-
national’ and has no seat. Furthermore, Article 26 of the ICSID Convention provides that 
consent to the ICSID arbitration excludes all other remedies unless the parties agree otherwise. 
 
235 See discussion on multilateral treaties at Chapter 3 above. 
236 See section V(b) of Chapter 1 above. 
237 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 218-21. 
238 See Romak v Uzbekistan PCA Case No. AA280 and the discussion at page 24-6 above. 
239 Blackaby et al op cit note 7 para 7.14. 
240 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 183. 
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In terms of Article 47 of the Convention and Rule 39(1)-(4) of the ICSID Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules), the ICSID tribunals may only 
recommend provisional measures to preserve the rights of the parties. A strict literal 
interpretation of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules suggests that an ICSID tribunal is not empowered to issue injunctive reliefs to preserve 
the rights of the parties but may only recommend measures which it considers necessary to 
prevent a party from suffering irreparable harm or dealing adversely with the subject matter of 
the arbitration.  
Arguably, the underlying philosophy of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention is to 
prevent the grant of anti-arbitration injunctions by municipal courts.241 Indeed, the grant of an 
anti-arbitration injunction by a national court would be a breach of the state’s undertaking to 
honour its commitment to the ICSID Convention by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.242 
However, there is no reason in principle why a municipal court cannot support the ICSID 
process by the grant of interim reliefs or the enforcement of provisional recommendations that 
have been granted by an ICSID tribunal just as ICSID awards may be enforced by judicial 
authorities.  
ICSID tribunals have been known to issue interim relief or, in the language of the ICSID 
Convention, provisional especially against competing court actions.243 However, the grant of 
interim injunctions by national courts in support of ICSID arbitration has been the subject of 
controversy.244 In ETI Euro Telecom International NV v Bolivia and Another,245 while 
observing that the English courts should not be easily predisposed to the granting interim reliefs 
in respect of ICSID arbitration, the English Court of Appeal also took the view that the use of 
the word ‘recommend’ at Article 47 does not prevent an ICSID tribunal from ordering interim 
relief.246  
Also, although ICSID tribunals may grant interim relief, it has been suggested that they 
are not in the practice of issuing injunctions against state parties.247 It is however submitted 
 
241 Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 110-16; Schreuer et al, op cit note 119 at 351-52. 
242 See Richard Garnett ‘National Court Intervention in Arbitration as an Investment Treaty Claim’ (2011) 60(2) 
International& Comparative Law Quarterly (2011) 485 at 488. 
243 MINE v Guinea ICSID Arb No 84/4(1985); Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case 
No.ARB/97/7(Procedural Order No.2 of 28 October 1999). 
244 Lim et al op cit note 1 at 183-84. 
245 (2008) EWCA Civ 880. 
246 See also Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain (supra).  
247 Paul Friedland ‘Commentary: ICSID tribunals and injunctions by state courts’ (2014) 18(3) Arbitration 
International 323 at 325. 
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that, the enforcement of such interim relief by national courts has no negative impact on the 
status of the ICSID mechanism as a self-contained system. In essence, there is no substantive 
reason why a national court cannot enforce such a relief. 
There is currently no statutory framework for the enforcement of ICSID provisional 
recommendations in Nigeria. The effect of this is that the Nigerian government  ̶  depending 
on the regime in power and its attitude to the rule of law and observance of international 
obligations    ̶ may choose not to comply with such measures although such non-compliance 
would amount to a breach of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. The existence of a statutory 
framework which allows a claimant who has obtained provisional recommendation in an 
ICSID proceeding to convert such a relief into an order of court would assist in ensuring that 
such an order is complied with. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF NON-ICSID AWARDS IN NIGERIAN COURTS 
a. Grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of awards under the New York 
Convention and UNCITRAL rules 
The New York Convention allows a party to resist enforcement on the grounds of incapacity 
of the parties or validity of the arbitrability, public policy, and incapacity of the parties to the 
agreement,248 grounds which are unavailable under the ICSID annulment mechanism.249 If the 
enforcement of an award is sought in a jurisdiction where the subject matter of the award is  
not arbitrable, such an award may be denied enforcement under the New York Convention.  
The Nigerian courts have adopted the test of accord and satisfaction as the guide in 
resolving the question of arbitrability.250 By this test, a dispute is arbitrable if it can be 
compromised by way of accord and satisfaction, hence matters bordering on crime,251 status252 
and public revenue253 are not arbitrable. Therefore the question of arbitrability poses no 
significant challenge in Nigeria. 
 
248 Article V (2) (a) and (b) of the New York Convention. By Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, a party may 
apply for the annulment of an ICSID award on the grounds of corruption and failure of the tribunal to state reasons 
for the award.  
249 Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
250 Kano State Urban Development Board v. Fanz Construction Ltd 1990 (4) NWLR (Pt. 142) 1 at 32-33 para H-
A (SC) ; United World Ltd. Inc. v. M.T.S. Ltd. 1998 LPELR 15-17 para A-A (SC); See also Paul Idornigie ‘The 
principle of arbitrability in Nigeria revisited’ (2004) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 282-83 
251 Mekwunye v Lotus Capital Ltd & Ors (2018) LPELR 45546 (CA). 
252 Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Co (supra). This includes matters relating to 
divorce, insolvency, bankruptcy, and other issues relating to status which statutes require courts to pronounce 
upon.  
253 Statoil Nigeria Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service (2014) LPELR 23144. 
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The public policy ground appears thornier.254 Indeed, public policy is an unruly horse255 
and a challenge on that ground could lead to unsatisfactory outcomes depending on the judicial 
system where the award is under consideration. This view is underscored by the recent decision 
of State Trading Corporation v Betamax256 where the Supreme Court of Mauritius set aside an 
award on the grounds of public policy. Although the Mauritian Supreme Court had previously 
determined that public policy had to be approached in the international sense257 rather than 
from a domestic standpoint, the court found that the failure to comply with local public 
procurement laws prior to the execution of the contract in respect of which the dispute arose 
constituted sufficient basis to set aside the award on the ground of public policy.258 While the 
decision may appear justifiable on the ground that violation of a condition in a domestic statute 
renders a contract illegal, the decision is a departure from the international approach to public 
policy as a ground for invalidating arbitral awards. 
The problem with public policy as a basis in the adjudication of disputes was aptly 
described in the case of Sonnar (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor v Partenreedri M.S Nordwind Owners of 
the Ship M.V Nordwind & Anor,259 where the Supreme Court observed as follows: 
‘…it is dangerous for a court to base its decision mainly on public policy, which indeed would 
be another means of avoiding the rules, law and procedure which govern a matter. Public policy 
is usually equated with public good. To ask a Court to decide only as a result of public policy 
or public good, goes beyond the measure of liberalism in the application of the law or even 
viewing a matter from the socio-economic context of law. Who is to determine what constitutes 
public policy? To rely on public policy or public good simpliciter, is to give room to uncertainty 
in the law. It’s a way to beg the question.’ 
In view of the vagueness of the notion of public policy, the Arbitration Act ought to be amended 
to include a definition of public policy that is precise enough to only allow challenge or refusal 
of enforcement on more ascertainable grounds.260  
 
254 See Paul Buchanan ‘Public policy and international commercial arbitration’ (1988) 26 American Business Law 
Journal 516-17. 
255 See the dictum of Borough J in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 at 252 (Court of Common Pleas). 
256 (2019) SCJ 154 (SC); Betamax has been granted leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
being the final court of appeal for Mauritius. 
257 Cruz City I Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Ltd (2014) SCJ 100(SC). 
258 The matter is now on appeal at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
259 ((1987) All N.L.R 548 at 564(SC). 
260 This proposal is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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b. Delay in enforcement and set aside proceedings in Nigeria 
While a party may choose arbitration to avoid litigation and a particular seat of arbitration 
which it considers to be unfavourable,261 such a party may still require the aid of such a national 
court especially in the enforcement or challenge of awards. Where particular care has not been 
taken to avoid an undesirable seat of arbitration, such a seat will be the forum for setting aside 
proceedings and the grant of court ordered interim measures.  
In view of the symbiotic relationship between courts and arbitral tribunals, the choice 
of arbitration may not completely assist a party in dispensing with litigation altogether. It is 
therefore important to discuss the inhibitions in the arbitration process in Nigeria especially as 
it relates to court assisted measures and post arbitral award litigation i.e. enforcement and 
setting aside proceedings.  
While the Nigerian courts have demonstrated support for the arbitral process in recent 
years,262 one of the challenges that has persisted in the area of post arbitral award litigation 
under the New York Convention enforcement mechanism is the delay associated with the 
proceedings owing to the congested court dockets. In essence post-arbitral award litigation are 
subject to the same delays as other court matters. In Nigeria, enforcement and setting aside 
actions (which are often consolidated when both are pending before the same court) have 
become ten-year court battles.263 Speed   ̶  which is one of the important advantages of 
arbitration especially in Nigeria  ̶  has therefore become an illusion in post-award proceedings 
in Nigeria.264 
Although an arbitral award may be enforced against the Nigerian government and its 
agencies and corporations in any New York Convention jurisdiction, provided there are assets 
that may attached in such a jurisdiction, in certain instances, a judgment creditor may be 
restricted in choice to enforcing in Nigeria. For example, where the arbitration has been 
conducted against an agency or government-owned corporation for instance a subsidiary of the 
NNPC with no assets outside Nigeria, the judgment creditor will only have the option of 
 
261 According to the 2015 Queen Mary International Arbitration Survey, enforceability of awards was chosen as 
the most valuable characteristic of arbitration followed by the desire to avoid certain national legal systems and 
courts. See Queen Mary School of International Arbitration ‘2015 Improvements and Innovations in International 
Arbitration’ available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2015/ last accessed on 1 October 2020. 
262 Statoil v NNPC 2013 (7) CLRN 72 (CA); Williams v Williams 2014 (15) NWLR (part 1430) 213 (CA) 
263 See Fagboyegun op cit note 99 at 52-53; Obiokoye Onyinye Iruoma Eradicating delay in the administration 
of justice in African courts: A comparative analysis of South African and Nigerian courts (unpublished LLM 
dissertation, University of Pretoria,2005) 36-40. 
264 See Fagboyegun ibid at 52-4. 
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enforcing the award in Nigeria with the attendant result that he may become embroiled in a 
decade-long enforcement court battle.  
c. Limitation period for the enforcement of arbitral awards 
Under Nigerian law, the limitation period for the enforcement of arbitral awards begins to run 
from the date of accrual of the original cause of action rather than the date on which the final 
arbitral award was issued.265 In the case of City Engineering v Federal Housing Authority,266 
the Supreme Court, in interpreting section 6 of the Limitation Law of Lagos State (now section 
8(1)(d) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State) held that the six-year limitation period for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards begins to count from when the original cause of action accrued.  
The effect of computing the limitation period from the date that the cause of arose is 
that in instances where the arbitral proceedings have been prolonged, the successful party will 
have a shorter period within which to apply for the enforcement of the award or may even lose 
the ability to enforce the award at all.  
V. REQUIREMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONSENT FOR 
ATTACHMENT BY GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS OF FUNDS IN 
CUSTODY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 
Where the unsuccessful party fails to comply with an award, the successful party is constrained 
to apply to court for the recognition and enforcement of such an award. An arbitral award, 
although binding, is not self-enforcing and lacks the force of a judgment of court. Where the 
losing party does not voluntarily comply with the award, the successful party may need to 
convert the award into a judgment of court by applying to court for recognition and 
enforcement to take advantage of the enforcement mechanisms available for enforcing court 
judgments. 
Two of the primary means of enforcing money judgments in Nigeria include writ of fi 
fa and garnishee proceedings267 writ of fi fa, and garnishee proceedings. Writs of fi fa are an 
effective means of enforcement because the judgment creditor applies to the registrar of court 
 
265 See Ifeanyi Ebokpo ‘Limitation period for the enforcement of arbitration awards in Nigeria: The imperative 
for a change’ (2019) 10 (4) The Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law 71 at 82. 
266 (1997) (9) NWLR (Pt.520) 224 at 245-46. 
267 Sections 44-46 and 83 of Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 40 of 1945. See also Fidelis Nwadialo Civil Procedure 
in Nigeria 2 ed (2000) 985; Ernest Ojukwu and Chudi Ojukwu Introduction to Civil Procedure 3 ed (2009) 339-
44. The use of judgment summons is less popular and essentially entails committing a judgment debtor who 
refuses to satisfy a judgment debt despite having the means to prison. There are also methods payment by 
instalments, the filing of a bankruptcy notice under the Bankruptcy Act and winding up proceedings under CAMA. 
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for the issuance of the writ through a fairly straightforward administrative process.268 Where 
the arbitral award is against a respondent who either does not own physical assets or owns  
insufficient physical assets but possesses liquid assets such as money in the bank or receivables 
in the hands of third parties, enforcement through a writ of fi fa becomes impracticable and 
garnishee proceedings may be a preferable option in realising the judgment debt.  
Garnishee proceedings entail the attachment of funds belonging to or due to a judgment 
debtor from a from a third party by means of a court order known as a garnishee order.269 By a 
court order known as a garnishee order, money standing to the credit of the judgment debtor in 
the hands of a third party known as the garnishee is attached and paid over to the judgment 
creditor. Where the unsuccessful party to a dispute is not a government entity, the garnishee 
process is usually seamless and can prove effective. However, where the government or its 
agencies is the custodian of the funds to be attached, there could be obstacles in realizing the 
judgment debt through garnishee proceedings notably, the requirement to obtain the consent of 
the Attorney General in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (‘the Sheriffs Act) before applying 
for garnishee orders.  
By section 84 of the Sheriffs Act, the consent of the Attorney General is a pre-condition 
for the attachment by garnishee proceedings of money in the custody or under the control of a 
public officer in his official capacity. Failure to obtain such consent renders the garnishee 
proceedings incompetent and liable to be set aside.270  
Section 84 of the Sheriffs Act is only relevant where the government or its entities is a 
counter party, or where the funds to be attached in execution are held by a government agency. 
It is therefore arguable that section 84 of the Sheriffs Act is unconstitutional for the reason that 
it is a law which places the validity of enforcement proceedings in the hands of a public official 
who is the chief legal officer of a counter- party to such proceedings.271  
Recently, the Supreme Court made an exception to the requirement of consent for funds 
held in the Central Bank of Nigeria(CBN) by the government in CBN v Intersella272 on the 
 
268 Order 4 Rule 17 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules Court; Nwadialo ibid at 986. 
269 See s.83 of the Sheriffs Act; Afe Babalola Enforcement of Judgments (2003) 91-3. 
270 National Insurance Commission v Oyefesobi (2013) LPELR 20660(CA). 
271 Strangely the courts have taken the view that section 84 is not unconstitutional. See the cases of See Onjewu v 
KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 827) 40 (CA) and Government of Akwa Ibom State v Powercom (Nig)Ltd (2004) 6 
NWLR (Pt. 868) 202(CA). 
272 2018 (7) NWLR (Part 1618) 294 (SC). It appears that in CBN v Intersella, the Supreme Court discountenanced 
the provisions of s.84(1) of the Sheriffs Act was because the Attorney General of the Federation was the judgment 
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ground that the CBN is not a public officer within the contemplation of section 84 of the 
Sheriffs Act. This decision was a departure from previous decisions of the superior court on 
the status of the CBN.273  The effect of this is that funds belonging to the government or its 
entities in CBN accounts may be attached by garnishee proceedings without the Attorney 
General’s consent. 
With respect to government funds in accounts other than CBN accounts, section 84 of 
the Sheriffs Act may pose an obstacle in respect of the enforcement of judgments relating to 
arbitral awards in Nigeria where government parties are involved and may serve to discourage 
investors who may view the provision as conferring an undue advantage on the government 
and government-owned entities by shielding them from their obligation to liquidate judgment 
debts.274  
VII. CONCLUSION 
It can be seen from this chapter despite the seemingly comprehensive legal framework for the 
investor-state arbitration in Nigeria, there are a number of inadequacies which may inhibit the 
efficiency of the system in Nigeria. The inadequacies of the NIPC Act especially as it relates 
to the lack of express consent to the ICSID mechanism ought to be addressed to provide for a 
more effective process. 
The case for a better statutory framework for Nigeria’s consent to the ICSID mechanism 
has been made. This is because the consent contained in the treaty is inadequate as the basis 
for investor state arbitration having regard to the limited number of Nigeria’s BITs. This will 
afford potential investors the benefit of ICSID arbitration in respect of their disputes where the 
home state of the investor remains a party to the ICSID Convention.  
Other issues such as the problems in the enforcement regime for non-ICSID awards 
have been explored. Practical impediments to the enforcement of judgments by garnishee 
proceedings, especially the requirement of obtaining the leave of the Attorney General for the 
validity of the proceedings, could serve to frustrate an investor from realising the fruit of the 
 
debtor and had been sued in his capacity as such, hence he could not have been expected to seek consent from 
himself. 
273 See CBN v Shipping Company Sara B.V (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt.1469) 130 at 135(CA). 
274 Afe Babalola ‘A call for the review or abolition of archaic, anachronistic and unconstitutional laws- Section 
84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act protecting government from payment of judgment debt’ (2013) 1(1) 
ABUD Law Journal 1 at 11-4,34-5; See also Udo Udoma & Belo Osagie ‘A discretion too far’ IFLR 2018 
https://www.iflr.com/Article/3839053/A-discretion-too-far.html accessed on 18 April 2020. 
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award. It is therefore desirable for the section 84 of the Sheriffs Act to be repealed in view of 
these concerns raised especially regarding the constitutionality of the said provision. 
The next chapter proposes solutions to the problems identified. Statutory consent to the 
ICSID mechanism will be discussed. Measures to improve the efficiency of the ICSID 
enforcement framework for both final awards and provisional measures is explored. The 
possibility of making the Arbitration Act regime more suitable for investor-state proceedings 























 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE CURRENT LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION IN NIGERIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the author considered the challenges with the current legal framework 
for the investor-state arbitration as an efficient mode of resolving investment disputes in 
Nigeria. This Chapter proposes the practical solutions that may be adopted towards solving 
these problems with a view creating a legal regime that affords investors a speedy and efficient 
dispute resolution mechanism in Nigeria. 
 The Amendment Bill to the Arbitration Act contains a number of innovations which 
will address some of the problems of the arbitral process in Nigeria. This chapter deals with 
the reforms in the Amendment Bill and additional suggestions towards addressing issues 
peculiar to the ISDS framework in Nigeria and other legal barriers towards an effective dispute 
resolution process. These recommendations are to be viewed as local solutions to the peculiar 
inhibitions in Nigeria, in addition to the reforms being devised at the international level by 
bodies such as the UNCITRAL Working Group III. 
 The following proposals will be made: (i) an amendment of the NIPC Act to provide 
for express consent to the ICSID Centre and also to make investment guarantees subject to the 
lawful and non-discriminatory exercise of regulatory powers of government, (ii) amendment 
of the ICSID Act to provide for the enforcement of provisional measures granted by ICSID 
tribunals and the possibility of extending the ICSID Act to ICSID additional facility awards; 
(iii) constitutional Amendments to provide for special procedures to be adopted by the high 
court of the states in adjudicating enforcement and setting proceedings, (iv) enforcement of 
arbitral awards in the high courts as a fast-track matter; (v) amendment of the Arbitration Act 
for computation of the limitation period to run from the date of the award; (vi) emergency 
arbitrator proceedings; (vii) small claims investment arbitration and expedited arbitration; (viii) 
third party participation; (ix) consolidation of arbitral proceedings; (x) providing a definition 
for public policy; and (xi) amendment of the Sheriffs Act to remove the requirement of consent 
of the Attorney General for attaching funds held by public officials. 
 
II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NIPC ACT 
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a. Express consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre 
The first proposal relates to potential amendments to the NIPC Act. As shown earlier, the 
consent of Nigeria to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre is conditional consent. Arbitration, 
whether commercial or investor-state, is based on the consent of the parties. As can be seen 
from the objection raised in the Interocean case, the lack of express consent as required by 
Article 25 of the Convention may constitute a ground for challenging the Centre’s jurisdiction 
in certain circumstances especially there is an existing treaty or other agreement which provides 
for a mode of dispute resolution other than ICSID.  
A comparison may be drawn between section 26(3) of the NIPC Act and the investment 
statute of one of Nigeria’s neighbours, Mauritania, where the Investment Code provides 
express consent to the ICSID Convention as a stand-alone option thereby removing any 
ambiguity or the possibility of jurisdictional objections on the basis of consent.275  
The provision of section 26(3) of the NIPC Act may also be compared with the 
provisions of section 22 of the Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) 
Act 39 of 1990 which provides for express consent. Section 22 provides as follows: 
In the event of any dispute in respect of a substantial matter arising from the provisions 
of the Decree, the aggrieved shareholder(s) in the company shall issue a letter of 
notification to Government formally notifying Government and the other shareholders 
of the dispute. The Government’s representatives and one of the Company’s 
shareholders as the case may be, shall make serious efforts to resolve amicably such 
dispute. In the event of failure to reach amicable settlement within 90n days of the date 
of the letter of notification mentioned above, such dispute may be submitted to 
arbitration before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The rendering of an award in respect of a party that has not consented to the jurisdiction 
of the centre amounts to the tribunal exceeding its powers which may lead to the annulment of 
such an award.276  Given this, it is proposed that sections 26(2) and (3) of the NIPC Act should 
be amended to expressly provide for the consent of Nigeria to the ICSID Centre. This will 
 
275 See Article 30 of the Mauritanian Investment Code Law No. 52 of 2012. Article 7.2(c) and (d) of the 
Mauritania’s Ordinance No. 89.013/CMSN of 1989 Concerning the Investment Code provides that disputes 
between a foreign investor and the government of Mauritania may be resolved according to the arbitration or 
conciliation procedure of the ICSID Convention and that the article constitutes the consent of Mauritania to ICSID 
276 See Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention; The principle of consent in investor state arbitration is 
essentially the same as what obtains in international commercial arbitration. Lack of consent to the process is a 
jurisdictional issue and will amount to an arbitral tribunal exercising powers that it has not been granted. See 
Blackaby op cit note 7 para 5.91. 
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afford greater comfort to investors who may wish to take advantage of the ICSID mechanism, 
especially those whose home states are also parties to the ICSID Convention for two reasons.  
First, investors from countries that are members of ICSID will be able to use the ICSID 
mechanism regardless of whether their home state has a BIT or has an MIT which contains 
consent to ICSID arbitration. Secondly, Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that, 
once consent is given, such consent cannot be unilaterally revoked, hence an investor is assured 
of the express consent of the Nigerian government and is unlikely to be met with a jurisdictional 
objection like in the Interocean case if express consent to the ICSID Centre is provided by 
legislation. 
b. Admission of investment subject to regulatory powers of the state 
As set out in Chapter 1, a principal criticism of the ISDS framework is that the mechanism 
often entails a curtailment of a state’s sovereign powers by private tribunals.277 The breach of 
a treaty standard usually entails the exercise of a state’s sovereign powers. Sometimes these 
powers are exercised for good reasons, yet the host state may be required to compensate an 
aggrieved investor who suffers loss as a result.278 When investment claims are successful and 
damages awarded, the perception is that states are being penalised by arbitral tribunals for 
implementing policies to address their peculiar challenges.279 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, it was argued that the state of crisis in the Nigerian 
judiciary has occasioned a growing lack of confidence in the court system,280 hence the current 
proposals made by the EU in creating a multilateral investment court may be unsuitable for 
Nigeria, at least in the short-term. Growing dissatisfaction with the court system shows that 
arbitration is still the preferred mode of commercial and investment dispute settlement in 
Nigeria.  
In view of the criticism of the ISDS framework as a private dispute resolution 
framework which sometimes curtails the regulatory or sovereign powers of a state, a balance 
must be found between the continued use of the ISDS framework as the preferred mode of 
 
277 Section III of Chapter 1 above. 
278 See for example the case of MetalClad Corporation v The United States of Mexico ICSID Case No. ARB(AF) 
/97/1, Award 30 August 2000. 
279 See for example Jennifer Reed, ‘South African revolutionizing foreign investment protection system’ (2014) 
6 Y.B. Arb. & Mediation 295 at 298-99 which explains the situation of South Africa and the immediate cause of 
discontent with BITs with Europe. 
280 See section IV of Chapter 1 above, Bamgbose op cit note 59 at 24-37. 
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dispute settlement in the Nigerian context on the one hand and the need to uphold the regulatory 
powers of Nigeria as a sovereign state on the other hand.281  
In proposing a possible amendment to the NIPC Act, the approach of a number of recent 
treaties on the issue282 may serve as a guide. For instance, the NIPC Act might be amended to 
include a provision which expressly provides that the investment guarantees contained in the 
NIPC Act are subject to the regulatory powers of the federal and state governments provided 
such powers are exercised in a non-discriminatory manner, in good faith, and in the overriding 
interest of the public, rather than the exercise of state powers against foreign investors in a 
discriminatory manner283 or sometimes for political reasons as was done in the 1970s.284  
Such an amendment will preserve the regulatory powers of the government while 
maintaining the protection and guarantees afforded to investors. In the proper exercise of such 
powers, a state will not be required to compensate an investor for an act which would otherwise 
amount to expropriation or another breach of a treaty standard or the obligations of the host 
state to protect a foreign investor where such an act has been done for the purpose, inter alia, 
of executing tax laws, protection and maintenance of public health, environmental safety or 
national security.  
However, an amendment of this nature must be balanced by including more investment 
guarantees than those in the current NIPC Act.285 Discriminatory and arbitrary conduct on the 
part of the government must be expressly prohibited. It must therefore be clear that the ‘police 
powers’ of the state to be exercised will apply to every natural and juristic person within the 
territory of the country and that such powers must only be exercised in good faith and to protect 




281 See for example Article 12 of the US Model BIT 2012. 
282 See Articles 12 and 13 of the US Model BIT 2012; article 3(2) of the Netherlands Model BIT 2019. 
283 See sections 4-5 of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 4 of 1972; Chibuike Uche ‘British government, 
British businesses, and the indigenization exercise in post-independence Nigeria’ (2012) 86(4) The Business 
History Review 745 at 752-755. 
284 Ann Genova ‘Nigeria’s nationalization of British Petroleum’ (2010) 20(1) The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 115. 
285 The NIPC Act currently contains only the guarantees relating to free transferability of funds and non-
expropriation of investment without compensation. See sections 24 and 25 of the NIPC Act. 
286 Note, however, that where such measure involves the seizure of property, compensation must be paid in 
accordance with section 44(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999(as amended). Where 
real property, compensation must be paid in accordance with sections 28 and 29 of the Land Use Act 6 of 1978. 
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d. Definition of ‘foreign investor’ in the NIPC Act 
As explained above, because foreign investors cannot carry out business in Nigeria without 
incorporating a company in Nigeria and registering same with the NIPC, it may be helpful to 
define who a foreign investor is for section 26 (2) and (3) of the NIPC Act. This is because a 
foreign investor who only has a negligible interest in a Nigerian company may seek to file an 
investment claim against Nigeria on the basis that the company is one with foreign participation 
which is registered with NIPC Act and therefore entitled to take advantage of the investment 
guarantees in the NIPC Act including the dispute resolution provisions.287  
 As explained in Chapter 2, ICSID tribunals have addressed this issue by inquiring into 
the ownership or controlling interest of such local companies. However, it is preferrable to 
amend the NIPC Act to define a ‘foreign investor’ as a company incorporated with Nigeria and 
duly registered with the NIPC Act but with the majority of its shares or controlling shareholding 
interests vested in a foreign national(s). This is line with ICSID jurisprudence on the subject288 
and will help prevent a situation where a Nigerian owned company with foreign participation 
which consists of only a minority or negligible foreign shareholding, may contend to be a 
foreign investor for the purpose of the dispute resolution provisions of section 26 (2) and (3) 
of the NIPC Act. 
 
e. Definition of ‘investment’ in the NIPC Act 
The vague definition of ‘investment’ in the current NIPC Act ought to be amended to 
incorporate the attributes of investment as defined in a number of ICSID cases, especially the 
Salini case.289 More specifically, the definition of ‘investment’ in the yet to be ratified 
Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016 should be adopted. This is because this definition in the BIT with 
Morocco contains the attributes of investment and clearly excludes commercial transactions.290 
 
 
287 Although as explained at Chapter 2, ICSID jurisprudence indicates that a tribunal will make an inquiry as to 
the controlling interest of a company, it is desirable to remove ambiguities by defining the term. It is noteworthy 
that section 26(2)(a) of the NIPC Act contains the consent of the Nigerian government to ad hoc arbitration in 
respect of disputes with local companies hence a company with majority Nigerian shareholding but with some 
foreign participation, is not without remedy if an investment dispute arises. 
288 See Liberian Eastern Timber Corp LETCO v Liberia ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2 award on 31 March 1986. 
289 See section II(d) of Chapter II above. 
290 See Article 1 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT 2016. 
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III. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ICSID (ENFORCEMENT OF 
AWARDS) ACT 
a. Enforcement of interim/provisional measures  
As already explained, party may require interim measures pending the conclusion of an ICSID 
arbitral proceeding for a number of reasons291 including to compel the production of 
evidence,292 restraining parallel domestic proceedings,293 or further aggravating the situation 
complained of.294 Although an ICSID tribunal possesses the powers to grant provisional 
measures in aid of the arbitral process, it lacks the powers to enforce such orders. 
By Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, submission to ICSID excludes recourse to all 
other remedies, hence once parties’ consent to ICSID arbitration, no remedy may be sought 
before a national court or judicial authority. 295 Article 26 has two effects. First, once parties 
submit to ICSID arbitration, they lose their right to seek relief in another forum. Secondly, no 
judicial authority may interfere with an ICSID arbitration process once commenced.296 The 
provisions of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention therefore accentuate the feature of the ICSID 
mechanism as a self-contained system with no seat of arbitration unlike UNCITRAL 
Arbitration. For this reason, national courts may be reluctant to grant injunctive relief in aid of 
an ICSID arbitration.297 
As shown at Chapter 3, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention empowers the ICSID 
tribunals to recommend ‘provisional measures’ which essentially serve the same purpose as 
interim measures usually granted by national courts in aid of commercial arbitration. Unlike 
interim relief granted by an arbitral tribunal in an UNCITRAL arbitration which may be 
enforced as an interim award by a court at the seat of the arbitration298 or which, if obtained 
from a court in the forum where it is to be enforced, may be enforced with relative ease by the 
court of such a forum,299 recommendations made further to Article 47 cannot be enforced by 
an ICSID tribunal.300 
 
291 Dugan op cit note 8 at 140-45. 
292 AGIP S.p.A v People’s Republic of Congo ICSID Case No.ARB/77/1. 
293 Holiday Inns SA and Others v Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1. 
294 Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 141. 
295 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
296 ibid. 
297 See for instance ETI Euro Telecom International NV v Bolivia and Another (2008) EWCA Civ 880 (HC). 
298 Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Rules. Blackaby et al op cit note 7 para 7.14-7.18. 
299 Blackaby et al, ibid 7.19. However, such interim awards are not enforceable under the New York Convention 
as they are not final awards. See Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 139. 
300 Dugan et al ibid at 138. 
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  ICSID tribunals have however acknowledged that these recommendations are in the 
nature of injunctive relief. In Mafezzini v Spain, the tribunal observed that the use of the word 
‘recommend’ at Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and ‘order’ as used elsewhere in the 
ICSID Convention to express the binding nature or otherwise of the measure is more apparent 
than real. The tribunal effectively equated the provisional measures with an award. A similar 
conclusion was reached in Tokolos Tokeles v Ukraine301 where the tribunal held that the 
provisional measures recommended by an ICSID tribunal are ‘legally compulsory’ and that 
parties are under a legal obligation to comply with them.302 The assistance of the court in the 
enforcement of such provisional measures is not be viewed as seeking relief outside the self-
contained ICSID mechanism but rather as giving effect to or complying with the ICSID 
mechanism. 
The ICSID mechanism could be strengthened by amending the ICSID Act to confer the 
powers to enforce provisional measures granted by an ICSID tribunal on the Supreme Court. 
Measures that require the force of an order of court include those relating to compelling the 
production of evidence, restraining parallel domestic proceedings,303 preventing irreparable 
injury,304 to prevent further wrongful actions or an aggravation of the existing circumstances305 
until the resolution of the dispute especially where the state in question may be unable to 
compensate the counter party through such pecuniary relief as may be eventually granted by 
the tribunal. 
It is therefore desirable to have a system in place that enables the enforceability of such 
measures in Nigeria. The inclusion of a legal framework in the ICSID Act to ensure that 
provisional measures granted by an ICSID tribunal may be enforced by the Supreme Court will 
afford more efficacy to the ICSID arbitration process to enforce such relief as may be granted 
by an ICSID tribunal.  
Furthermore, such an amendment to include the enforcement of provisional measures 
by the Supreme Court could be viewed as Nigeria’s consent to the right of the claimant to seek 
provisional measures from a judicial authority further to rule 39(6) of the ICSID rules which 
 
301 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No.1, Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures. 
302 See also Occidental Exploration and Production Co v Ecuador LCIA Case No. UN 3467) Final Award 1 July 
2004. 
303 See for example Holiday Inns v Morocco; Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic 
of Guinea ICSID Case No.ARB/84/4. 
304 Steven Finizio, Ethan Shenkman and Julian Mortenson ‘Recent developments in investor-state arbitration: 
effective use of provisional measures’ 2007 European Arbitration Review 15 at 16. 
305 Dugan et al note 8 at 141. 
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permits the parties, provided that they have so stipulated in the agreement recording their 
consent, to request from a judicial or other authority, provisional measures prior to or after the 
institution of the proceeding, for the preservation of their respective rights and interests. 
b. Enforcement of ICSID Additional Facility awards under the ICSID Act 
In spite of the wide ratification of the ICSID Convention, there are a number of important 
absentees, including a few whose nationals have substantial investments in Nigeria.306 
Nationals of such states may utilise the ICSID Additional Facility Rules in resolving 
investment disputes. However, unlike ICSID arbitration, an ICSID Additional Facility 
arbitration has a seat of arbitration,307 hence awards rendered under the system may be set aside 
at such a seat. Moreover, ICSID additional facility awards are enforced under the New York 
Convention and may be subject to prolonged enforcement proceedings through the hierarchy 
of the superior court system. This is because by Article 3 of the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility mechanism is not governed by the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention.308  
 Nigeria’s obligation to ensure that ICSID awards are enforced like the final judgments 
of its national courts does not extend to ICSID Additional Facility awards. As a matter of 
exercising its sovereign legislative powers and providing an additional incentive in the area of 
investment protection, the National Assembly could extend the enforcement mechanism 
afforded by the ICSID Act to ICSID Additional Facility awards. This would enable investors 
from some of Nigeria’s important trading partners which are not parties to the ICISD 
Convention to take advantage of the finality afforded by the ICSID Act. 
In making such an amendment to the ICSID Act, it is important to bear in mind that 
because such awards may be set aside at the seat of arbitration, a reasonable opportunity must 
be afforded an unsuccessful party who may have grounds upon which to apply for the setting 
aside of the award. An amendment extending the ICSID Act to the enforcement of ICSID 
additional facility awards must therefore be made subject to the lapse of the three month time 
frame within which a setting aside application must be filed in Nigeria,309 or in the case of 
foreign-seated arbitration, any such time as may be prescribed in the statute of the seat of 
arbitration for the setting aside of arbitral awards.  
 
306 For instance, India and South Africa. 
307 Article 20 of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules. 
308 Ibid Article 3. 
309 Section 29 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
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Where there are grounds upon which an award may be challenged, the above measure 
will afford an aggrieved party the opportunity of doing so. Having regard to the limited grounds 
upon which an award may be refused enforcement under the New York Convention, where an 
unsuccessful party lacks cogent grounds to challenge an award or after such setting aside 
proceedings are concluded, such an award may then be enforced directly at the Supreme Court 
without the rigours of prolonged post arbitral award litigation through the superior court 
hierarchy of Nigeria.  
The proposal for making enforcement and setting aside proceedings fast track matters 
may take care of the prolonged proceedings that a setting aside proceedings may occasion prior 
to when the successful party make take advantage of the proposed amendment to the ICSID 
Act to enforce such at the Supreme Court. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TOWARDS PROVIDING A MORE 
EFFICIENT REGIME FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF NON-ICSID ARBITRAL AWARDS 
The enforcement of foreign arbitral award in Nigeria is governed by the Arbitration Act310 and 
the New York Convention.311 A decision of the High Court recognising and enforcing an 
arbitral award, refusing the recognition and enforcement of award, or setting aside of an arbitral 
award is subject to appeals to the Court of Appeal and further to the Supreme Court.312 
 The result of this is that the element of speed in respect of arbitration has become 
whittled down in recent times owing to significant delays in post arbitral award litigation which 
usually follows. This specie of litigation, in the form proceedings for the setting aside or 
enforcement of arbitral awards,  has now become the second stage in what is essentially a two-
stage dispute resolution process where if there is an arbitration agreement; first, the parties 
participate in arbitration and secondly, after the final award is handed down, the parties then 
engage in litigation by way of enforcement or setting aside proceedings at the High Court 
sometimes all the way to the Supreme Court.313  
 The problem of delay can be remedied by amending the constitution to: (1) make 
special provisions for the composition of the High Courts of the various states and the Federal 
 
310 Sections 31, 51, 52 and 54 of the Arbitration Act. 
311 Ibid Section 54. 
312 Section 241(1)(a) and 233(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. 
313 See Fagboyegun op cit note 100 at 52-3. 
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High Court for arbitration related proceedings and, (2) to restrict the right of appeal by making 
the Court of Appeal the final appellate for arbitration-related matters. Such amendments might 
limit further appeals to the supreme court to grounds of fundamental human rights similar to 
the provisions of the constitution, which restricts the grounds of appeals from decisions of  the 
national industrial court to issues relating to fundamental human rights.314 The restriction of 
appeals in industrial matters decided by the national industrial court was put in place to ensure 
an element of finality in employment litigation and to avoid a situation where employees (who 
are usually in a weaker position especially impecunious ones who cannot afford prolonged 
litigation) are subjected to prolonged appellate litigation.  
 An amendment of this nature to similarly restrict the right of appeal in respect of 
arbitration-related proceedings must take into account the quality of the High Court bench in 
the various states to reduce the chances of incorrect decisions. It is therefore suggested that the 
composition of the High Court when considering whether an arbitral award ought to be 
enforced or set aside, be increased to three justices. By increasing the composition of the High 
Court to three justices when considering the enforceability or otherwise of an arbitral award, 
and making the Court of Appeal the final appellate court, the chances of incorrect decisions are 
significantly reduced, thereby striking a balance between dispensing substantial justice and  the 
desire for speed. 
 It is also suggested that the proposed amendment should be extended to all arbitration 
related proceedings including the grant of interim measures in aid of arbitration, orders relating 
to discovery, interrogatories, the subpoena of witnesses etc. This is because it is undesirable 
for such interlocutory matters to become the object of prolonged appeals intended merely to 
delay the process, as Nigerian litigation lawyers are reputed to act.  
 The measures suggested above would address the problem of prolonged proceedings in 
respect of enforcement and setting aside proceedings and also the possibility of prolonged 
interlocutory actions regarding interim measures while also ensuring that injustice is unlikely 
 
314 See section 243(2) of the Constitution which provides that appeals from the National Industrial Court shall 
only lie to the Court of Appeal as of right in respect of questions of fundamental rights. Section 243(3) provides 
that where any law prescribes that that an appeal shall lie from decisions of the National Industrial Court to the 
Court of Appeal, such an appeal shall be with the leave of the Court of Appeal. It is however important to note 
that in the case of Skye Bank v Iwu (2017) NWLR 16 NWLR (Pt. 240) 1, the Supreme Court held that 
notwithstanding these provisions, no constitutional provisions expressly divests the appellate jurisdiction of Court 
of Appeal over all decisions of National Industrial Court on civil matters. 
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to be occasioned to a party who is dissatisfied with an arbitral award or who has a reasonable 
or legitimate basis to contest interim measures. 
 However, constitutional amendment in Nigeria is a cumbersome process and may not 
happen in the short-term unless the National Assembly considers that there are urgent problems 
of national importance to be addressed, in which case the relevant participants may cease the 
opportunity to insert such reforms. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AS A FAST-TRACK 
MATTER 
In the absence of constitutional amendment, which as stated above, is a time-consuming and 
sometimes difficult political process,315 an alternative solution which would prove effective in 
reducing the delays in enforcement proceedings in the short-term may be devised. This may be 
achieved by the issuance of practice directions for the enforcement of arbitral awards or the 
amendment of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules to provide for the adjudication of 
enforcement applications as fast-track matters.  
Order 59(1) of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 provides 
that the object of the fast-track procedure is to ensure that matters initiated under the procedure 
are concluded within a timeframe of nine months, from the date of commencement to 
judgment. By Order 59(2), only the following matters qualify for the fast-track procedure: (a) 
claims commenced by writ of summons or counter claims for liquidated money demands in the 
sum of N100,000,000 and above and (b) claims involving mortgage transactions, charges or 
other securities. 
It is proposed that applications for the enforcement or for the setting aside of arbitral 
awards should be included in the matters to be considered as fast-track matters in the civil 
procedure rules or by way of practice directions. This will ensure that such matters are speedily 
dispensed with. Such a fast-track procedure could also be included in the rules of the appellate 
courts, i.e. the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In the past, the Court of Appeal 
demonstrated commitment to the ADR process by creating the Court of Appeal Mediation 
Programme (CAMP) in the Court of Appeal Rules 2011.316 It is proposed that a fast-track 
 
315 Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides that an Act of the National Assembly for the alteration of the 
constitution shall not be passed in either House of Assembly unless the proposal is supported by the votes of not 
less than two-thirds majority of all members of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. 
316 This has been retained since then. See Order 16 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016. 
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procedure also be introduced in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal Rules for appeals 
relating to arbitration matters to ensure that arbitration related appeals are speedily adjudicated. 
A time frame of nine months (similar to what is contained in the fast-track procedure in the 
High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules) should also be introduced in an amendment 
to the Court of Appeal Rules. 
It is therefore submitted that the amendment of the Rules of Court or the issuance of 
practice directions as suggested above could be effective solutions in addressing the delays in 
respect of enforcement or setting aside proceedings in Nigerian courts. 
VI. LIMITATION PERIOD FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
As addressed in Chapter 4 above, the limitation period for awards rendered in ad hoc arbitration 
proceedings is reckoned from the date when the cause of action arose rather than when the 
arbitral award is delivered.317 The result of this is that when arbitral proceedings have lasted 
for a long time,318 the successful party may find that such an award is already barred or 
prescribed by statute. As discussed at section IV(b)(i) of Chapter 2 above, the Amendment Bill 
seeks to cure this anomaly by providing that the limitation period will begin to run from the 
date the award was issued rather than when the original cause of action arose. 
 
VII. EMERGENCY ARBITRATOR PROCEEDINGS 
As stated at section IV(b)(iv) of Chapter 2 above, the Amended Bill to the Arbitration Act also 
provides for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator where urgent interim relief is required. 
By the Proposed Amendment Bill, such relief may be sought from an institution agreed 
between the parties and failing such an agreement, from the court. This will enable a party to 
obtain urgent relief that may be required before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. 
VIII. SMALL CLAIMS INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND EXPEDITED 
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 
While the principle of party autonomy which affords the parties significant control over the 
arbitral process is an important element of the arbitral process,319 it is also desirable that some 
 
317 City Engineering Ltd v Federal Housing Authority (supra). 
318 See for example the case of The Ocean Victory: Gard Marine and Energy Limited v China National Chartering 
Company Ltd and Another [2017] UKSC 35(SC) where the arbitration lasted for eleven years. 
319 Blackaby et al op cit note 7 para 1.104. 
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measure of expedition is attained in the arbitral process, especially where time is of the essence 
to one or more parties.  Although time limits are usually included in the procedural timetable 
of ad hoc proceedings, parties may take the liberty to default in complying with such timelines.  
One of the disadvantages of the ad hoc arbitration process is that the efficiency of the 
process depends on the cooperation of the parties,320 hence, parties sometimes employ the delay 
tactics typically associated with litigation. In providing for expedited proceedings, the 
possibility of shutting out a party or preventing such a party for not complying with procedural 
timelines may give rise to fair hearing considerations. Such considerations may be addressed 
by providing a fair opportunity for extension of time applications. The fact that an arbitration 
has been conducted in default of participation by a party, owing to an inordinate delay by such 
a party in presenting his case, should not be a sufficient basis to nullify a proceeding. This is 
because the requirement of fair hearing only entails affording a party reasonable opportunity 
to present his case and does not necessarily imply that a party will be indulged infinitely.321 
Including a special provision for small claims and expedited proceedings will afford 
aggrieved investors with small claims the benefit of having their disputes resolved speedily. 
This will help prevent incurring large costs and loss of time in respect of small claims as is 
sometimes the case where parties do not abide by the timelines agreed upon in the usual ad hoc 
proceedings.  
 A small investment claim - which is proposed to be defined as claims not exceeding 
US$ 1 million - could be resolved on an expedited basis. With the exception of cases which are 
by their nature complex and may consequently require a fair amount of time, the Arbitration 
Rules should be amended to include to provide for expedited proceedings. In essence a claim 
below US$ 1m may be expedited unless the arbitrator or tribunal reaches the determination that 
more time will be required for the resolution of the dispute due to its complexity. Such proposed 
expedited proceedings could be designed to ensure that matters conducted under the procedure 
are concluded within a timeframe of six months.322 
 
320 This is unlike institutional arbitration where timelines are set by the rules of the institutions and are expected 
to be complied with by the parties; See also Blackaby et al op cit note 7 para 1.145. 
321 Diga v Tony (2013) LPELR 20768 (CA). 
322 See for example Article 4(1) of the ICC Expedited Procedure Rules and Article 42 of the Swiss Rules of 
International Arbitration 2012. 
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This is to ensure time and cost efficiency for ‘small claims’.323 For instance, article 
30(2)(a) of the ICC Arbitration Rules provides that the Expedited Procedure Rules shall apply 
to disputes where the claim does not exceed US$2 million. Similarly, Article 42(2) of the Swiss 
Rules of International Arbitration 2012 provides that the expedited procedure contained therein 
will apply to disputes where the amount claimed does not exceed CHF1 million unless the court 
decides otherwise. 
Given that the expedited procedure usually entails an abridgement of the evidential 
hearing,324 it is important to avoid pitfalls which may lead to the setting aside of the award of 
the award on the grounds of fair hearing or inability of a party to present his case as highlighted 
above.325 It is also important to state that the procedure may be inappropriate for complex 
matters or those where expert evidence or extensive oral evidence is required.326 
IX. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION  
There has been a drive towards greater transparency in the investor-state arbitration.327 Unlike 
international commercial arbitration which usually involves business disputes between 
individuals or private entities and as a result is typically kept confidential,328 the public nature 
of investment arbitration has triggered a departure from the principle of confidentiality and a 
move towards transparency because such disputes usually arise out of the obligation of 
governments and the effect that such awards ultimately have on the general public.329 The 
requirement of accountability by government has given rise to a demand for transparency in 
ISDS. 
 
323 Peter Michaelson ‘When speed and cost matter: Emergency and expedited arbitration’ (2014) 218(4) New 
Jersey Law Journal 50. 
324 See Irene Wesler and Christian Klausseger ‘Fast track arbitration: Just fast or something different’ Austrian 
Arbitration Yearbook 2009, 274 available at 
https://www.cerhahempel.com/fileadmin/docs/publications/Welser/Beitrag_Welser_2009.pdf accessed on 01 
August 2020.  
325 ibid 269. See also Klaus Peter Berger ‘The need for speed in international arbitration’ Kluwer Law International 
(2008) 25(5) 599-600.  
326 See Wesler and Klausseger op cit note 324 at 274.  
327 See the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty Based Investor State Arbitration 2014; See also 
for example Article 29 of the US Model BIT 2012; Gary Born and Stephanie Forrest ‘Amicus Curiae Participation 
in Investment Arbitration’ (2019) 34(3) ICSID Review 626 at 628,63; See also Christina Knahr and August 
Reinisch ‘Transparency v Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration – The Biwater Gauff 
Compromise’ 2007 6 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 97 at 110-115.  
328 Article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that the proceedings shall be confidential unless the parties 
agree otherwise. 
329 Tomoko Ishikawa ‘Third party participation in investment treaty arbitration’ 2010 59(2) ICLQ 373 at 375-76; 
Dugan et al op cit note 8 at 706; Adeola Awojobi Confidentiality in Investor State Arbitration (unpublished LLM 
Dissertation University of Cape Town, 2015) 63. 
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The practice of affording non-disputing parties the opportunity of filing written 
submissions gained traction in NAFTA chapter eleven arbitrations.330 With the coming into 
force of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency Based Investor-State Arbitration on 18 
October 2017 in respect of treaties concluded after 1 April 2014 except where parties agree 
otherwise, transparency rather than confidentiality may soon become one of the distinctions 
between investor-state arbitration and commercial arbitration. 
 The Nigerian government has not concluded any treaty since 2006, hence the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are not applicable to Nigeria’s existing BITs. It is therefore 
suggested that the Nigerian Arbitration Rules be revised to include the provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules to ensure that arbitral proceedings conducted under the 
arbitration rules are transparent. While the rules will not apply to ICSID arbitration involving 
Nigeria, the rules will apply where the arbitration is ad hoc and has its seat in Nigeria. 
 The inclusion of such rules by way of an amendment to the Arbitration Rules will 
ensure that the Transparency Rules apply to disputes that may be initiated either on the basis 
of Nigeria’s existing treaties since a good number of them contain the option of UNCITRAL 
arbitration or investment agreements which provide for UNCITRAL Arbitration.  
The inclusion of a transparency regime in Nigeria’s Arbitration Rules will allow for 
greater scrutiny and allow third party participation through the submission of amicus briefs in 
respect of arbitral proceedings involving the government and may be helpful in avoiding 
undesirable results as a result of corrupt practices or inadequate representation in Nigeria seated 
proceedings.331 Furthermore, in addition to other reforms, transparency may give greater 
legitimacy to the ISDS system.332  
X. CONSOLIDATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
 
330 Awojobi, ibid 59. 
331 The importance of transparency in investor-state arbitration especially for Nigeria came to the fore in 
enforcement proceedings in respect of the London seated Process and Industrial Development Ltd v Nigeria 
arbitration recently. In this arbitration where the recording breaking sum of US$ 6.6 billion was awarded as 
damages against Nigeria, allegations that the underlying contract was procured by bribing top government 
officials have come to light. It has also been suggested that if the proceedings had been made public, the outcome 
might have been different, perhaps because public scrutiny might have put greater pressure on Nigeria’s defence 
team and led to the presentation of evidence relating to these allegations of corruption at the arbitration. See Kate 
Beioley and Neil Munshi ‘The $6bn judgment pitting Nigeria against a London court’ Financial Times 12 July 
2020 available at https://www.ft.com/content/91ddbd53-a754-4190-944e-d472921bb81e accessed on 12 July 
2020. 
332 Gary Born & Stephanie Forrest ‘Amicus curiae participation in investment arbitration’ (2019) 34(3) ICSID 
Review 626, 627. 
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One of the procedural practices of litigation which may be incorporated into the ad hoc 
arbitration process is the consolidation of similar arbitral proceedings involving the same 
parties and the same subject matter.333 A matter may be consolidated where (1) a common 
question of law or fact arises in both or all the causes or matters, (2) rights to reliefs are claimed 
in respect of a arises out of the same transaction, or (3) for some other reason, it is desirable to 
make an order of consolidation.334 
Just as the primary objective of consolidation in litigation is to save time and cost,335 
introducing the measure into ad hoc investor-state arbitration will afford the parties greater 
speed and also helps prevent the possibility of conflicting decisions in respect of matters with 
similar facts if such matters were to be decided by different tribunals. 
 Given that the nature of arbitration is based on the consent of the parties, such a measure 
must be agreed to by the parties.336 Indeed, section 35(2) of the Arbitration Act ch.23 of 1996 
of England provides that unless the parties agree to confer such powers on the tribunal, the 
tribunal has no power to order consolidation or concurrent hearing.  
 A provision should be included for the consolidation of proceedings or concurrent 
hearings where the parties consent and in instances where the parties to both or all proceedings 
are the same, common questions of law or fact are likely to arise for determination or in any 
other instance where there are cogent reasons for such consolidation. Furthermore, the rules of 
some arbitral institutions such as the ICC Court of Arbitration337 and the Swiss Chambers’ 
Arbitration Institution already provide for consolidation of proceedings and for joinder of 
parties.338 
 
XI. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC POLICY AS A GROUND FOR THE SETTING 
ASIDE OF AN AWARD 
The Amendment Bill replaces the current grounds upon which an award may be set aside with 
the clearer ones.339 The ground of public policy remains one of the grounds for setting aside 
 
333 See Order 41 Rule 7 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019. 
334 Naboth Okwuagbala & Ors v Margaret Ikwueme & Ors (2010) 12 SC (Pt. IV) 1(SC). 
335 Diab Nasr v Complete Home Enterprises (Nigeria) Limited (1977) 5 SC 1 at 11(SC). 
336 See Article 33 of the US Model BIT 2012. 
337 Article 10 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration 2017. 
338 Article 4(1) and (2) of the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, respectively. 
339 This contrasts with the provisions of the current section. 
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under the Amendment Bill and upon which recognition and enforcement may be refused under 
the New York Convention. 
The Amendment Bill should be revised to include a clear definition of public policy, 
preferably one which restricts it to matters bordering on illegality, violation of human rights, 
contravention of penal statutes and mandatory provisions of civil laws. This will help to 
eliminate the vagueness of the term and prevent the ground from becoming a subject of abuse 
in the hands of unscrupulous or tardy judicial officers. 
XII. REPEAL OF SECTION 84 OF THE SHERIFFS AND CIVIL PROCESS ACT 
Finally, as explained at Chapter 3, by section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, funds in 
the custody of a public officer can only be attached in execution of judgment with the consent 
of the Attorney General. The provisions of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 
may be a stumbling block in instances where the respondent is a government-owned entity 
which has contracted as a separate juristic entity and its own name, and such a government 
entity has no physical assets which may attached in execution.  
Attorneys General in Nigeria, especially at the federal level, in recent times, have 
primarily been politicians who occupy office to do the bidding of their employers rather than 
independent public servants.340 In view of this, an Attorney General might be inclined to 
frustrate efforts to levy execution against a government-owned entity. If the Attorney General 
withholds consent, a judgment creditor may be constrained to file an administrative law 
action341 to compel the Attorney General to grant the consent, thereby leading to further delays 
in the enforcement process. 
It is therefore proposed that the requirement of subjecting a judgment that has been 
obtained against a government-owned entity to the approval of the Attorney General   ̶ who is 
an agent of the executive arm of government  ̶  ought to be addressed by repealing section 84 
of the Sheriffs Act. 
 
340 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration) Bill, No.19, 2017 ‘seeks to 
establish the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation and of the State separate from the office of the 
Minister of, or Commissioner for, Justice to make the office of the Attorneys-General an independent and 
insulated from partisanship.’ See also Ebuka Onyeji ‘Why Nigeria’s Office of the Attorney-General should be 
separated from Minister of Justice – Adoke’ Premium Times 12 September 2019 available at 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/352026-why-nigerias-office-of-the-attorney-general-should-
be-separated-from-minister-of-justice-adoke.html last accessed on 19 November 2020.  
341 In such an instance, the appropriate administrative law remedy is an of mandamus. See Ese Malemi 




The Arbitration Act is currently undergoing its first comprehensive review since 1988 to 
introduce amendments that are long overdue. It is hoped that a culture of regular consultation 
aimed at identifying the clogs in the wheel of the arbitration framework will be developed, 
especially in view of the emergence of several arbitral institutions on the Continent and the 
consequent competition to attract international arbitrations to Nigeria. Nigeria cannot stay 














CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
Nigeria has progressed from a regime of nationalisation and indigenisation in the 1970s to one 
of relative economic liberalism as enshrined in legislation such as the NIPC Act in the mid- 
1990s. The enactment of the NIPC Act and Foreign Exchange Miscellaneous Provisions Act  
in 1995 signified a remarkable departure from contradictory government actions in the legal 
framework governing foreign investment, as evidenced by the simultaneous pursuit of a policy 
of indigenisation and nationalisation, and the ratification of investment protection and 
arbitration conventions, in the late 1960s and 1970s.  
While investment protection statutes and treaties alone may not be sufficient to attract FDI, 
those measures are essential for the creation of a healthy investment climate. Furthermore, 
having cited an inefficient judicial system and unreliable dispute settlement mechanisms as 
some of the challenges that discourage foreign investors, it is clear that the provision of an 
efficient and neutral dispute resolution mechanism is a vital investment protection measure.  
To this end, the importance of the                     assurance that a neutral and effective dispute 
resolution mechanism creates for a foreign investor cannot be over-emphasised. Nigeria 
established a reputation for being an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction relatively early. It was the 
first African state to ratify the ICSID Convention. In the past decade, several important court 
decisions342 have entrenched the country’s reputation as an arbitration friendly jurisdiction. 
However, this research reveals that there are practical inhibitions in the arbitration mechanism 
in Nigeria.  
Accordingly, the dissertation explored solutions to the inadequacies in the legal framework 
for investor-state arbitration in Nigeria by proposing a number of reforms both in respect of 
ICSID and non-ICSID investor-state arbitration. These recommendations are additional 
measures to the ongoing reforms aimed at addressing the backlash against the ISDS mechanism 
on the global stage.  
With respect to the ICSID framework, this dissertation outlines several solutions to address 
many significant issues in improving the efficacy of the ICSID mechanism in Nigeria. First, 
the conditional consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID Centre at section 26(3) of the NIPC Act 
was discussed. The possibility that nationals of a number of countries may be barred from 
 
342 Statoil v NNPC 2013 (7) CLRN 72; Williams v Williams 2014 (4) CLRN 86 
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taking advantage of this conditional consent was considered. Accordingly, it is preferrable to 
amend the NIPC Act to provide the express consent of Nigeria to ICSID arbitration. 
Furthermore, statutory consent is preferrable to that contained in treaties, considering the 
limited number of BITs and the unavailability of consent in virtually all the MITs in force. 
Another important factor is the definition of ‘investment’ as contained in the NIPC Act, 
especially because of its significance to jurisdiction. The broad definition of investment in the 
current NIPC Act may elevate commercial claims to the status of investment claims. 
Consequently, a more restrictive definition of investment in line with prevailing ICSID 
jurisprudence, was proposed to ensure that Nigeria’s submission to the ICSID Centre is only 
in respect of investment claims and to avoid opening a floodgate to commercial claims in 
general. 
The enforcement of interim relief in aid of ICSID arbitration is controversial because the 
ICSID mechanism is ‘self-contained’. Once there is a valid submission to the jurisdiction of 
the ICSID Centre, parties may not seek relief from national courts or any other forum. 
However, a party may require interim relief in aid of the arbitral process. While ICSID tribunals 
may grant provisional measures in aid of the arbitration, tribunals lack the power to enforce 
these measures. A party may need to enforce a provisional measure to preserve evidence, 
preserve the subject matter of the arbitration, prevent a further aggravation of the situation 
complained of, amongst other reasons.  
This dissertation therefore argues that the amendment of the ICSID Act to provide for the 
enforcement of provisional measures, further to Rule 39 of the ICSID Rules, is an important 
measure for the support of the ICSID system in Nigeria. 
Falling outside of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility awards cannot be 
enforced directly at the Supreme Court. Although widely accepted, there are a few important 
absentees from the ICSID Convention such as India and South Africa. Nigeria hosts significant 
investment from these countries; hence it is proposed in this work that the ICSID Act be 
extended to include the enforcement of ICSID additional facility awards. Extending the ICSID 
Act to include the enforcement of ICSID additional facility awards in this manner is to be done 
in the exercise of state legislative powers rather than in fulfilment of Nigeria’s obligations 
under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
In the non-ICSID context, this dissertation recommends several reforms in addition to those 
already contained in the Proposed Amendment to the Arbitration Act. A constitutional 
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amendment to provide a special regime for post-arbitral award litigation was considered. This 
entails measures to ensure that enforcement and setting aside proceedings are not subject to 
prolonged litigation through the superior court hierarchy. The possibility of including post-
arbitral award litigation on the list of matters for fast-track proceedings is an alternative to 
constitutional amendment because the process of constitutional amendment in Nigeria is 
cumbersome and may be more difficult to implement. 
Other recommendations include the possibility of special provisions for the expeditious 
determination of small investment claims, defined in this dissertation as disputes not exceeding 
US$1 million in value. This is aimed at ensuring the cost-effectiveness of such proceedings. 
Another recommendation is the inclusion of a definition of public policy as a ground for setting 
aside of arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act or the refusal of recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards under the New York Convention. Lastly, the amendment of section 84 of the 
Sheriffs and Civil Process Act to remove the requirement for the consent of the Attorney 
General as a pre-condition for the attachment of funds in the custody of public officials, in 
enforcing money judgments against the government or government corporations is suggested. 
While the above measures may not guarantee a perfect dispute resolution system, they are 
likely to significantly address the current deficiencies in the legal framework in Nigeria. 
Having discussed the symbiotic relationship between arbitration and the court system, it is 
hoped that the reforms required to restore the Nigerian judiciary  ̶ once reputed for high 
standards, and known to export judges to other African countries  ̶  to its rightful place will 
occur speedily. Perhaps, in future, the reform of our judiciary may lead to talks about the 
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APPENDIX TWO: NIGERIA’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES* 
 
Country 












China (2001) 6     
months 
✓  X ✓  X 
Finland (2005) 3 
months 
✓       ✓     X ✓  
France (1990) 6 
months 
X X    X ✓  
Germany (2000) 6 
months 
X     X   X ✓  
Italy (2000) 6 
months 
✓  ✓     X ✓  
Korea, Republic of  (1998) 6 
months 
X X  X ✓  
Netherlands, the (1992) X     .X X  X ✓  
      
Romania (1998) 6 
months 
✓  ✓                            X ✓  
Serbia (2002) 6 
months 
✓  ✓     X ✓  
      
South Africa (2000)* 6 
months 
X X ✓  ✓ * 
      
Spain (2002) 6 
months 
✓  ✓  X ✓  
      
Sweden (2002) 6 
months 
✓  ✓  X ✓  
      
Switzerland (2000) 6 
months 
✓  ✓  X ✓  
      
United Kingdom (1990) 3 
months 




** This table contains only BITs that have been passed into law. The text of the Taiwan-
Nigeria BIT(1994) was unavailable at the time of writing. 
**   ICISID Additional Facility 
X: Not applicable 
